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Prior to Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.121 (SFAS No.121): 
Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and Long-Lived Assets to Be 
Disposed Of, managers had substantial discretion concerning the amount and timing of 
reporting writedowns of long-lived assets. Moreover, the frequency and dollar amount of 
asset writedown announcements that led to a large “surprise” caused the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) to consider the need for a new standard to guide the recording of impairment of 
long-lived assets.  
This study has two primary objectives. First, it investigates the effects of SFAS 
No.121 on asset impairment reporting, examining whether SFAS No.121 reduces the 
magnitude and restricts the timing of reporting asset writedowns. Second, the study 
compares the information content (surprise element) of the asset impairment loss 
announcement as measured by cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) before and after the 
issuance of SFAS No.121.  
The findings provide support for the hypothesis that the FASB’s new accounting 
standard does not affect the magnitude of asset writedown losses. The findings also 
provide support for the hypothesis that SFAS No. 121 does not affect the management 
choice of the timing for reporting asset writedowns. In addition, the findings suggest that 
the market evaluates the asset writedown losses after the issuance of SFAS No. 121 as 
good news for “big bath” firms, while, for “income smoothing” firms, the market does 
 ii
not respond to the announcements of asset writedown losses either before or after the 
issuance of SFAS No. 121. The findings also suggest that, for “big bath” firms, the 
market perceives the announcement of asset impairment losses after the adoption of 
SFAS No. 121 as more credible relative to that before its issuance. This could be because 
the practice of reporting asset writedowns after the issuance of SFAS No. 121 is under 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The primary role of accounting standard setters is to define the accounting 
language that is used by management to communicate with the firm’s external 
stakeholders. Stakeholders include current or potential investors and creditors; employees 
and their unions; financial intermediaries such as auditors, financial analysts, and bond 
rating agencies; regulators; suppliers; and customers.  Corporate managers, through the 
use of accounting standards established by the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), convey private information on their firm’s performance to external capital 
providers and other stakeholders. Therefore, financial reporting is intended to allow the 
best-performing firms in the economy to distinguish themselves from the poor-
performing firms, thus facilitating efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions 
by stockholders (Healy and Wahlen 1998). New financial accounting standards, 
therefore, add value if they enable financial statements to effectively communicate 
differences in firms’ economic positions and performance in a timely and credible 
manner.  
Since financial accounting reports convey managers’ private information on their 
firm’s performance, standards have to permit managers to exercise judgment in financial 
reporting and to have discretion over reporting financial information. Managers can then 
use their knowledge about the business and its opportunities to select reporting methods 
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and estimates that match the firm’s economics. However, because auditing is imperfect 
and management has its own incentives, management’s use of judgment also creates 
opportunities for “earnings management” in which managers choose reporting methods 
and estimates that do not adequately reflect their firm’s underlying economics. Therefore, 
management’s use of judgment in financial reporting has both costs and benefits. The 
costs are the potential misallocation of resources that arise from earnings management. 
Benefits include potential improvements in management’s credible communication of 
private information to external stakeholders. Thus, it is critical for standard setters, for 
example, the FASB, to evaluate standards in order to establish the reasonable degree of 
discretion that allows for higher accounting information value.     
In March 1995, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 
No. 121 (SFAS No.121): Accounting for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and Long-
Lived Assets to Be Disposed Of. This statement mandates that, under certain 
circumstances, property, plant and equipment; identifiable intangible assets; and goodwill 
arising from purchasing these assets should be deemed “impaired” and written down to a 
new carrying amount. This standard was issued in response to the diverse practices in 
recognizing asset writedowns and in response to the increased frequency and large 
amounts of asset writedowns. Prior to the issuance of SFAS No.121, no explicit guidance 
existed on accounting for the impairment of long-lived assets, whereas the authoritative 
accounting literature was specific regarding the appropriate treatment of declines in the 
value of short-term assets (e.g., inventory and marketable securities). Although the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB) Opinion No. 17: Intangible Assets (1970) indicates 
that one general problem associated with accounting for long-lived assets is determining 
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when carrying amounts have declined “permanently and substantially,” a framework for 
determining when a writedown loss should be recorded and how should it be measured is 
not provided. This absence of explicit guidance for asset impairments permitted 
substantial management discretion over amounts, presentation, and timing of writedowns. 
Many of these writedown decisions had substantial economic consequences, for example, 
lowering reported earnings. Specifically, management had the ability to affect when the 
writedown was reported and to affect the amount of the writedown, given the subjectivity 
of the many estimates that were required. In addition to their timing and magnitude, 
management also varied the presentation of discretionary write-offs. For instance, during 
the 1960s, the fundamental question was whether material, but irregular or infrequent, 
charges were to be disclosed as prior-period adjustments in the statement of retained 
earnings or as a part of the earnings statement. In 1966, APB Opinion No. 9: Reporting 
the Results of Operations (APB9) adopted the all-inclusive income concept, although a 
few items continued to qualify as prior-period adjustments. While it is required by APB 9 
to report most losses in the earnings statement, management sought to treat asset 
writedown losses as non-operating and nonrecurring (Elliott and Shaw 1988). Therefore, 
SFAS No.121 was issued to reduce management’s discretion over reporting asset 
impairment in order to reduce the potential of earnings management. 
Francis et al. (1996) believe that the expressed demands for authoritative guidance 
on accounting for asset impairments appear to be based on a notion that management 
takes advantage of the discretion afforded by the accounting rules to manipulate earnings. 
Earnings could be manipulated either by not recognizing impairment when it has 
occurred or by recognizing it only when it is advantageous to do so. Moreover, since 
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managers have incentives to manage earnings and investors are unable to undo these 
manipulations, an authoritative guidance on asset impairment was needed. In addition, 
the FASB’s decision that accounting for long-lived assets and identifiable intangibles to 
be disposed of should be included in the scope of SFAS No.121 could be seen as 
evidence of the implicit motivation of adopting SFAS No.121. In the FASB’s view, “if 
those assets were not addressed, an entity could potentially avoid the recognition of an 
impairment loss for assets otherwise subject to an impairment write-down by declaring 
that those assets are held for sale” (FASB, 1995, par 47). Therefore, SFAS No.121 was 
issued in order to restrict management’s opportunities of managing earnings through 
asset writedown decisions. 
Many members of the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory Council 
(FASAC) asserted that the problem of large “surprise” asset writedowns was significant 
enough to make asset impairment one of the most important issues for the FASB to 
address (FASB, 1995, par. 41). Large “surprise” asset writedowns might be seen either as 
possible management manipulation or real asset impairment. Zucca and Campbell (1992) 
reported that 87% of the firms disclosed asset writedowns either as a fourth-quarter 
adjustment in their annual report or as an asset writedown loss in their annual report 
without indicating to which quarter it pertained. This finding substantiates the claim of 
many analysts that the discretionary writedown of long-lived assets has a “surprise” 
element. Managers prefer to wait until earnings and stock performance for the fiscal year 
are known, so that they may then use this information in deciding whether to take a 
writedown or not (Alciatore et al. 1998). This action by firms encouraged the FASB to 
issue SFAS No.121 in order to minimize any possible management manipulation in 
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accounting earnings. That is, the FASB attempted to place some constraints on 
management’s practice of asset writedown reporting.     
However, the issuance of SFAS No.121 was not expected to eliminate or reduce 
management discretion over the timing and amount of asset writedowns. Rees et al. 
(1996) and Munter (1995), among others, argue that although SFAS No.121 provides 
specific examples of changes in circumstances that indicate a need for review of asset 
values, management’s estimates of future cash flows determine whether a writedown is 
necessary. Furthermore, due to the absence of quoted prices for many firm-specific 
assets, it is likely that management estimates of fair value will determine the amount of 
the asset writedown. Zucca (1997) believes that there are some areas of SFAS 121 in 
which its application is subject to the judgment and assumptions of management: 1) the 
definition of impairment indicators, 2) the estimation of future cash flows from the use of 
the asset, 3) the asset grouping level at which testing and measurement occur, and 4) the 
depreciation methods chosen for the asset. Booker (1996) believes that much judgment 
will be needed to implement the standard. Identification of those assets that might be 
impaired, estimating future cash flows, fair values and making grouping decisions will all 
require judgment. Titard and Pariser (1996) state that FASB’s approach in SFAS No.121 
gives management substantial flexibility to exercise judgment in determining and 
reporting impairment losses. Some of its provisions are broad enough to enable 
management to formulate aggressive or conservative approaches to the recognition of 
asset impairment losses. Therefore, reducing management discretion over the timing and 
amount of asset writedowns by the issuance of SFAS No.121 is somewhat questionable.  
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This study investigates the effect of SFAS No.121 on asset impairment reporting, 
attempting to discover whether SFAS No.121 has decreased management’s discretion 
over asset writedown decisions. Moreover, it examines the information content of asset 
impairment loss announcements after the issuance of SFAS No.121, as measured by the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The following section discusses the importance of 
the asset writedown announcement and its potential effect on the stock price. 
1.2 The Importance of the Asset Writedown Event 
The increasing prevalence of writedowns in the 1990s is documented in numerous 
articles in the popular press (e.g., Brown 1991), in the attention given to writedown by 
regulatory bodies (e.g., Spindel 1991), and in the academic empirical research on asset 
writedowns (e.g., Elliot and Shaw 1988; Elliot and Hanna 1996; and Francis et al. 1996).   
One example is Bausch & Lomb, which reported a surprise writedown loss that was 
headlined in USA Today dated January 26, 1995. Bausch & Lomb’s stock price plunged 2 
¼ points on the day of that announcement. The Wall Street Journal began its report of 
Bausch & Lomb’s 1994 earnings with the following explanation: “Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 
struggling to straighten out several core businesses, took several one-time costs that 
resulted in substantial loss in the period” (Bounds 1995, p. A4). Among Bausch & 
Lomb’s problems were a decrease in its expected return on sales from its oral-care 
business, which it considered an asset impairment (Scofield 1995).  
Elliott and Shaw (1988) and Francis et al. (1996) identified Compustat firms with 
calendar year-ends with negative special items constituting at least 1% of end-of-year 
total assets (see Table 1). A special item is defined in the Compustat database as a charge 
that is either unusual or infrequent, but not both, and is therefore separately disclosed in 
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the earnings statement on a pretax basis. As Table 1 clearly indicates, the frequency of 
writeoffs has increased sharply since 1982. The Compustat firms that reported negative 
special items increased from 59 firms in 1982 to almost double that in 1985 and then 
sharply increased within five years to 535 firms.   
Moreover, Fried et al. (1989) conducted a study to provide insights into the 
development of additional standards for accounting and reporting impairments and 
writeoffs of long-lived assets. Part of their sample consisted of 324 companies with 623 
writeoffs in the years 1980-1985, which reflected an average of almost two (1.92 = 
623/324) writeoffs per firm over six years or one writeoff every three years. The 
distribution of writeoffs in terms of frequency and dollar amount for that sample is 
presented in Table 2. As this table clearly indicates, the frequency and total dollar amount 
of writeoffs increased sharply over time. Fried et al. (1989) emphasized that the increase 
in dollar amount is not solely the result of increased frequency but also of the average 
dollar amount of writeoffs, which grew sharply over the 1980-1985 period. The average 
post-tax amount was $21 million in 1980, increasing steadily to $44 million in 1984, and 
then almost doubling in 1985 to $100 million. On a pre-tax basis the results are similar. 
Moreover, based on Elliott and Shaw (1988), the average percentage of asset writedowns 
to total assets was 8.2% for the 1982-1985 period. Similarly, Francis et al. (1996) 
reported that the average percentage of asset writedowns to total assets was 6.7% for the 
1988-1992 period. This clearly shows the importance of the asset writedown event and its 
effect on a firm’s earnings and returns. The frequency and dollar value of asset 
writedowns made the FASB and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
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consider a new standard to guide the recording of impairment of long-lived assets. The 
following section develops and discusses this study’s research questions.  
1.3 Research Questions 
Many researchers (e.g., Francis et al. 1996; Rees et al 1996) believed that SFAS 
No.121 was issued as a response to management’s discretion over asset writedowns, 
which led to large “surprises” that were reflected in the cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR). Therefore, this study investigates whether SFAS No.121 decreased 
management’s discretion over asset writedown decisions. Moreover, the study examines 
the information content of the asset impairment loss announcements after the issuance of 
SFAS No. 121. The research questions are as follows:    
What are the effects of SFAS No.121 on management’s discretion over asset 
writedown reporting? Are the effects of SFAS No.121 reflected in the stock 
market? 
 
To answer these research questions, the study has investigated the sources of 
discretion that management has when reporting asset writedowns. Management has 
substantial discretion over the amount, presentation, and timing of reporting writedowns 
of long-lived assets, which are three ways that are used when managing earnings. After 
the issuance of SFAS No.121, the discretion over asset writedown presentation was 
restricted by the statement’s requirement of reporting the writedown losses as a 
component of income from continuing operations before income taxes. Management 
discretion about the amount and timing of reporting asset writedowns still exists. In order 
to examine whether SFAS No.121 reduces management discretion over asset writedowns 
decisions, this study examines the two other sources of management’s discretion related 
to asset writedowns, that is, the amount and timing of reporting asset writedowns. 
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Moreover, the study investigates the effect of SFAS No.121 on the market surprise as 
reflected in the CAR. It is hypothesized that the information content of the asset 
writedown announcements before and after the issuance of SFAS No.121 will be 
different from each other. 
Therefore, the research questions are as follows:  
1. Does SFAS No.121 restrict management’s opportunities to record long-lived asset 
writedowns? That is, does SFAS No. 121 reduce the magnitude and restrict the 
timing of reporting asset writedowns?  
 
2.   Do asset writedown losses that are reported after the issuance of SFAS No.121 
have lower/higher information content as measured by CAR? That is, during the 
period surrounding the release of asset writedown announcement, does the CAR 
of companies adopting SFAS No.121 differ from the CAR of companies that 
announced asset impairment before the adoption of SFAS No.1211? 
 
The issue of whether SFAS No.121 constrains management’s discretion in 
recognizing asset impairment losses does not appear to have been investigated in the 
prior literature. Since the asset writedown literature is based primarily on observing and 
analyzing asset writedown practices in the absence of authoritative guidance, the findings 
from that literature cannot be fully utilized without investigating the effect of SFAS 
No.121 on the management’s discretion over measuring and reporting asset impairment. 
This study also provides evidence as to whether previous asset writedown literature can 
be extended in the same direction, that is, asset writedowns as discretionary events. In 
addition, this study provides standard setters, i.e., the FASB, an answer to the central 
question as to whether too much judgment is allowed to management under SFAS 
No.121 in reporting asset writedowns. 
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In summary, the objective of this study is to investigate whether SFAS No.121 
restricts management’s discretion over reporting asset impairment and whether SFAS 
No.121 helped in reducing earnings management through reporting asset impairment 
losses. The next chapter presents an overview of the background of SFAS No.121 and 
reviews the various provisions of that standard. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1 The same methodology was used by Mittelstaedt et al. (1992) in their study about the informativenses of 




CHAPTER TWO  
BACKGROUND ON SFAS NO.121 
This study reviews and discusses SFAS No.121 and its major requirements, with a 
critique of some of those requirements in this chapter.      
2.1 Introduction 
Under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), long-lived assets are 
initially recorded at historical cost, which approximates fair value at acquisition. With the 
exception of the cost of most land acquisitions, cost is allocated through depreciation and 
amortization processes. Cost less depreciation or amortization is reported in the balance 
sheet and is referred to as the “carrying amount.” Since accounting depreciation and 
amortization is aimed at cost allocation not valuation, carrying amounts of long-lived 
assets may be less than or greater than their fair values. Before SFAS No.121, accounting 
standards generally did not address when impairment losses should be recognized or how 
impairment losses should be measured (FASB, 1995, par 2).  
In 1995, the FASB issued SFAS No.121, which provides guidance to preparers of 
financial statements on how to identify impaired assets, how to estimate the fair value of 
impaired assets, and how to disclose asset impairment to financial statement users. This 
standard helps users by bringing some consistency to a previously unstructured area of 
accounting (Scofield 1995). A summary of the underlying background of the SFAS 
No.121 adoption and the major requirements of it are presented next. 
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2.2 The Background of SFAS No.121 Issuance 
Before SFAS No.121, companies generally wrote down an asset when there was 
evidence of permanent impairment in the ability to fully recover the asset’s carrying 
amount. Companies did this without following any specific authoritative guidance (Titard 
and Pariser 1996). As a result, practice was diverse.  Managers had the opportunity to 
estimate how much and when to record long-lived asset writedowns. This gave 
management some ability to manage their firm’s earnings in their own or their firm’s best 
interest. This fact led the regulatory bodies to discuss the impairment issue during the 
1980s and up to the mid-1990s.  
In July 1980, the Accounting Standards Executive Committee of the American 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AcSEC) sent the FASB an Issues Paper. 
AcSEC advised the FASB to provide specific authoritative accounting guidance for the 
impairment of assets. However, in the same year, the Financial Accounting Standards 
Advisory Council (FASAC) also discussed accounting for impairment of long-lived 
assets and recommended that the FASB continue its work on the conceptual framework 
project and other agenda topics before adding a project on impairment of assets (FASB, 
1995, par 38 & 39). After five years, in March 1985, FASAC members believed that 
impairment of assets was the second most important issue for the FASB to address. 
Moreover, in September 1986, most FASAC members supported adding a project on 
impairment to the FASB technical agenda.  
Other accounting authoritative bodies also saw the need to examine the issue of 
impairment. The FASB Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) discussed the issue of 
impairment at its meetings in October 1984, December 1985, and February 1986. EITF 
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members noted that there were divergent measurement practices in asset impairment 
accounting. Its members also noted a significant increase in the frequency and size of 
writedowns of long-lived assets (FASB, 1995, par 40). In September 1986, the 
Committee on Corporate Reporting of the Financial Executives Institute (FEI) published 
the results of its Survey on Unusual Charges. They indicated various reporting and 
measurement practices (FASB, 1995, par 42). In May 1987, the Institute of Management 
Accountants (IMA) adopted a research study to examine accounting for asset impairment. 
The IMA research report, Impairments and Writeoffs of Long-Lived Assets, published in 
May 1989, also, noted a variety of disclosure practices and a steady increase in the 
number of writedowns. The report suggested that authoritative guidance on the 
accounting for impairment of long-lived assets was needed (Fried et al. 1989).  
In November 1988, the FASB added a project to its agenda to address accounting 
for the impairment of long-lived assets and identifiable intangibles. In May 1989, a task 
force was formed to assist with the preparation of a Discussion Memorandum about 
accounting for impairment assets. The FASB’s Discussion Memorandum: Accounting for 
the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets and Identifiable Intangibles, was issued in 
December 1990 (FASB, 1995, par 44).  
In 1991 the FEI updated their survey and found that there still were divergent 
reporting and measurement practices. This further confirmed the need for authoritative 
guidance on impairments (FASB, 1995, par 42).   
Later, the FASB issued an Exposure Draft: Accounting for the Impairment of 
Long-Lived Assets, in November 1993 that reviewed issues in the Discussion 
Memorandum, as well as some additional concerns. In November 1994, the FASB 
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published a Special Report: Results of the Field Test of the Exposure Draft on Accounting 
for the Impairment of Long-Lived Assets. It contained the results of a field test of the 
Exposure Draft. Ten entities participated in the field test by completing a comprehensive 
questionnaire. That questionnaire asked participants to detail the accounting policies and 
procedures used in the recognition and measurement of previous impairment losses and 
adjustments to the carrying amounts of assets to be disposed of. The questionnaire also 
asked what the effects would have been had the provisions of the Exposure Draft been 
applied to the same losses and adjustments. Then, the FASB, after considering numerous 
comments, issued SFAS No.121 in March 1995, effective for fiscal years beginning after 
December 15, 1995, making 1996 the first year during which most companies applied the 
standard.  
2.3 Scope 
SFAS No. 121 initially dealt with the impairment of long-lived assets and 
identifiable intangibles to be held and used. However, the FASB concluded that 
considering the goodwill arising from the acquisition of long-lived assets and identifiable 
intangibles was essential when testing for an assets impairment. Moreover, the FASB 
decided that accounting for long-lived assets and identifiable intangibles to be disposed 
of should be included in the scope of this statement. In the FASB’s view, if those assets 
were not addressed, managers could potentially manage their firm’s earnings through 
avoiding the recognition of an impairment loss by declaring that those assets were held 
for sale (FASB, 1995, par 47).  SFAS No.121 applies to long-lived assets, certain 
identifiable intangibles, and goodwill related to those assets to be held and used and to 
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long-lived assets and certain identifiable intangibles to be disposed of (FASB, 1995, par 
3).  
2.4 Asset Impairment Investigations 
For assets that continue to be used in operations, SFAS No.121 requires a two-
stage approach to recognizing impairment losses (see Figure 1). An entity shall review 
long-lived assets and certain identifiable intangibles to be held and used for impairment 
whenever events or changes in circumstances indicate that the carrying amount of an 
asset may not be recoverable. The FASB gave examples of some circumstances and 
events that require firms to investigate for asset impairment:  
•  A significant decrease in asset market value. 
 
•  A significant physical change in an asset or how it is used. 
 
•  A significant adverse change in business climate, legal factors or regulatory 
factors affecting an asset. 
 
•  A continuing operating or cash flow loss for revenue-producing assets (FASB, 
1995, par. 5). 
 
While these examples provide a useful starting point, they still leave management 
with a great deal of discretion for implementation. An important point to understand is 
that the existence of an “event or circumstance” does not automatically mean that an 
impairment loss will be recognized on assets held for use in operations. It does mean, 
however, that the entity must undertake a formal impairment evaluation in accordance 
with SFAS No.121. When there is reason to suspect the asset carrying amount is not 
recoverable, a company is required to review for impairment (Munter 1995). 
This event-oriented approach does not require that every asset be evaluated every 
year. Evaluation of specific assets is required only when circumstances indicate that 
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impairment may have occurred. Firms need not continually monitor each asset for 
impairment but must continually monitor their business for events or circumstances that 
may indicate asset impairment (Scofield 1995). Existing information and analyses 
developed for management review of the entity and its operations generally will be the 
principal evidence needed to determine when an impairment may exist. 
2.5 Evaluation for Asset Impairment 
When a firm believes that the carrying amounts of some of its assets are not 
recoverable, it is required to perform a recoverability test as a means to determine 
whether impairment has occurred. The recoverability test is made by comparing the 
carrying amount of the asset to the sum of the future undiscounted cash flows and 
without including interest charges expected from the asset’s use and eventual disposition 
(O' Brien 1996). If the estimate of the future cash flows projected from the use of the 
assets, including ultimate disposal (undiscounted and without interest), are less than the 
current carrying value of the asset, an impairment loss would be recognized (FASB, 
1995, par. 6). “Future cash flows are the future cash inflows expected to be generated by 
an asset less the future cash outflows expected to be necessary to obtain those inflows” 
(FASB, 1995, par 6). 
The recoverability test is an acceptable approach, in the FASB’s point of view 
(FASB, 1995, par 67 & 68), for identifying when an impairment loss must be recognized. 
It is an approach that uses information that the FASB believes is generally available to an 
entity. From a practical standpoint, the FASB believes that the potential usefulness of this 
test is sufficient to overcome any objection. 
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However, one important question to address is “How long a future period does the 
estimated cash flow projections need to be made?” Unfortunately, that question is not 
specifically addressed in SFAS No.121. The theoretical answer, of course, is for the 
length of time the entity expects to use the asset. The major problem with this answer is 
that, in reality, an entity will be aggregating assets with differing remaining useful lives. 
Thus, if the company uses a time horizon longer than the remaining life of some assets, it 
will have to include an assumption of disposal and reinvestments in similar assets in 
constructing the net cash flow projections. 
2.6 Impairment Loss Measurement 
For any asset that fails the recoverability test, an entity would proceed to a second 
step, which deals with the measurement of the impairment loss. This step entails 
comparing the carrying amount of the asset to its fair value. The impairment loss will be 
measured as the amount by which the carrying amount of the asset exceeds the fair value 
of the asset. “The fair value of an asset is defined as the amount at which the asset could 
be bought or sold in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a 
forced or liquidation sale” (FASB, 1995, par 7). 
The new cost basis of the impaired asset is its fair value on the date of the 
impairment. Since the fair value represents a new cost basis, no subsequent recoveries are 
permitted (FASB, 1995, par 11). The asset may be re-evaluated in the future, however, if 
it becomes apparent that additional impairment may have occurred (Zucca 1997). The 
interesting aspect of this requirement is that the loss amount is not the difference between 
the carrying amount and the expected future undiscounted cash flows. Rather, it is the 
amount by which the asset’s carrying amount exceeds its fair value.  
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SFAS No. 121 also requires entities to apply a hierarchy to determine an impaired 
asset’s fair value: 
•  The asset’s market value if an active market exists.  
 
•  If no active market exists but such a market exists for similar assets, the 
selling prices in that market may help in estimating the fair value of the 
impaired assets. 
 
•  If no market price is available, a forecast of expected cash flows may help in 
estimating its fair value in which the cash flows are discounted at a rate that is 
commensurate with the risk involved (FASB, 1995, par 7). 
 
Therefore, estimates of future cash flows are used to determine whether an 
impairment loss should be recorded. They may also be used for the determination of fair 
value if market values are either not available or unreliable. However, the former 
estimates of future cash flows are undiscounted and without interest, while the other 
estimates of future cash flows are discounted.    
The FASB defended itself in adopting fair value by concluding that a company’s 
decision to continue operating rather than selling an impaired asset essentially is a capital 
investment decision. Since management believes that operating the asset is more 
beneficial than selling it, the FASB feels that a new cost basis has to be recognized and 
that the fair value of the impaired asset is the most appropriate measure because fair 
value generally is used when a new cost basis is established (FASB, 1995, par 69). The 
FASB concluded that fair value was the best measure because it was consistent with 
management’s decision process. The FASB believed that using fair value to measure an 
impairment loss was not a departure from the historical cost principle. Rather, it was 
consistent with principles practiced whenever a cost basis for a newly acquired asset must 
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be determined (Titard and Pariser 1996). It is a consistent application of principles 
practiced elsewhere in the current system of accounting.  
The opponents of fair value believed that using fair value to measure an impaired 
asset fails to recognize the nature of that asset, permits “fresh-start” accounting based on 
management’s decision to keep an asset rather than to sell it, and usually results in an 
excessive loss in the current period and an excessive profit in future periods. The 
opponents of fair value also believed that recoverable cost and recoverable cost including 
interest are some approaches other than fair value that can be used in measuring the 
impairment loss.  
“Recoverable cost is measured as the sum of the undiscounted future cash flows 
expected to be generated over the life of an asset” (FASB, 1995, par 77). It views the 
recognition of an impairment loss as an adjustment to the historical cost of the asset. 
“Recoverable cost including interest generally is measured as either (a) the sum of the 
undiscounted expected future cash flows including interest costs on actual debt or (b) the 
present value of expected future cash flows discounted at some annual rate such as a debt 
rate” (FASB, 1995, par 82). The proponents of recoverable cost agree that the time value 
of money should be considered in the measure, but they view the time value of money as 
an element of cost recovery rather than as an element of fair value. However, since the 
impaired assets are owned by different entities that have different debt capacities, the 
FASB believed that the use of the recoverable cost including interest measure would 
result in numerous carrying amounts for essentially the same impaired assets (FASB, 
1995, par 85).   
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 In addition, an impairment loss that results from applying SFAS No.121 should 
be recognized prior to performing the depreciation estimates and method revision 
required under the 1970 APB Opinion No. 20: Accounting Changes (APB20). The 
provisions of APB 20 should be applied to the reporting of changes in the depreciation 
estimates and method regardless of whether an impairment loss is recognized. 
2.7 Impairment Loss Recognition 
This statement requires that long-lived assets and certain identifiable intangibles 
to be held and used or to be disposed of be reported at the lower of carrying amount or 
fair value less cost to sell, except for assets that are covered by the 1973 APB Opinion 
No. 30: Reporting the Effects of Disposal of a Segment of a Business, and Extraordinary, 
Unusual and Infrequently Occurring Events and Transactions (APB30). Assets that are 
covered by APB 30 will continue to be reported at the lower of carrying amount or net 
realizable value (FASB, 1995, par 7). 
Theoretically, three alternative recognition criteria are used in practice: economic 
impairment, permanent impairment, and probability of impairment (FASB, 1995, par 59). 
The economic criterion recognizes losses whenever the carrying amount of an asset 
exceeds the asset’s fair value. A continuous evaluation for impairment of long-lived 
assets is required under this approach, similar to the ongoing lower-of-cost-or-market 
measurement of inventory. To avoid recognition of writedowns that might result from 
measurements reflecting only temporary market fluctuations, the FASB favored using 
either the permanence or probability criterion (FASB, 1995, par 60). 
When the carrying amount of an asset exceeds the asset’s fair value, permanent 
loss recognition is called for under the permanence criterion. The permanence criterion is 
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too restrictive and virtually impossible to apply with any reliability. Moreover, the 
permanence criterion is not practical to implement, since requiring management to assess 
whether a loss is permanent requires management to predict future events with certainty, 
which is impossible (FASB, 1995, par 61).  
The probability of impairment criterion calls for recognition of impairment loss 
when it is deemed probable that the carrying amount of an asset cannot be fully 
recovered. It uses the sum of the expected future cash flows (undiscounted and without 
interest charges) to determine whether an asset is impaired. If that sum exceeds the 
carrying amount of an asset, the asset is not impaired. If the carrying amount of the asset 
exceeds that sum, the asset is impaired, and the recognition of a new cost basis for the 
impaired asset is triggered. The FASB believes that this approach is consistent with the 
definition of “asset impairment”, which is the inability to fully recover the carrying 
amount of an asset with a basic presumption underlying a statement of financial position 
that the reported carrying amounts of assets should, at a minimum, be recoverable 
(FASB, 1995, 62).  
2.8 Goodwill 
Goodwill arising in a business combination treated as a purchase must be 
allocated to the assets being measured for impairment. The goodwill amount will be 
eliminated first before the carrying value of any of the individually identifiable assets, 
whether tangible or intangible, is reduced for an asset impairment (FASB, 1995, par 12).   
2.9 Asset Groupings 
“Assets shall be grouped at the lowest level for which there are identifiable cash 
flows that are largely independent of the cash flows of other groups of assets” (FASB, 
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1995, par 8). Generally, grouping assets at the lowest possible level will result in the 
recognition of more impairment losses than if the assets were grouped at higher levels 
because of offsetting unrealized gains and losses. At the extremes, the evaluation of 
single assets will yield the greatest number of impairment losses, while considering the 
entity as the appropriate grouping level will result in the least number of impairment 
losses (Zucca 1997). Thus, as a general rule, the more inclusive the grouping scheme, the 
less will be the impairment loss, if any, be recognized.  
The size and sophistication of the entity will have a bearing on the level of 
aggregation that can be used. An entity that is large, diversified, and decentralized will 
likely be able to aggregate at a lower level of operations. However, a small business that 
operates in one industry and within one marketplace might be required to make estimates 
for the entire organization as the basis for the impairment evaluation. 
2.10 Reporting and Disclosing Asset Impairments 
“An impairment loss for assets to be held and used shall be reported as a 
component of income from continuing operations before income taxes for entities 
presenting an income statement and in the statement of activities of a not-for-profit 
organization” (FASB, 1995, par 13). If an entity reports a subtotal such as “income from 
operations,” the impairment loss should be reflected in that subtotal. An entity that 
recognized an impairment loss shall disclose all of the following in the financial 
statements: 
•  A description of the impaired assets and the facts and circumstances 
leading to the writedown; 
 




•  The caption in the income statement in which the impairment loss is 
aggregated if that loss has not been presented as a separate caption or 
reported parenthetically on the face of the statement; and  
 
•  If applicable, the business segment affected (FASB, 1995, par 14). 
There are many alternative ways, theoretically, for reporting an impairment loss: 
reporting the loss as a component of continuing operations, reporting the loss as a special 
item outside continuing operations, or separate reporting of the loss without specifying 
the classification in the statement of operations (FASB, 1995, par 108). The FASB 
adopted reporting the impaired loss as a component of continuing operations. Its rationale 
behind this adoption is that, if no impairment had occurred, an amount equal to the 
impairment loss would have been charged to operations over time through the allocation 
of depreciation or amortization. That depreciation or amortization charge would have 
been reported as part of continuing operations of a business enterprise. Further, an asset 
that is subject to a reduction in its carrying amount due to an impairment loss will 
continue to be used in operations.  
2.11 Assets to be Disposed of 
For assets that are to be disposed of, not held and used, the recognition and 
measurement of impairment losses depends on whether disposal of the impaired asset is 
covered under APB 30. When it does apply, SFAS No. 121 requires that the impairment 
loss be measured at the lower of carrying amount or net realizable value. If APB 30 does 
not apply, the impairment loss is measured at the lower of carrying amount or fair value 
less cost to dispose (FASB, 1995, par 8). An entity that holds assets to be disposed of 
shall report gains or losses resulting from the application of SFAS No.121 as a 
component of income from continuing operations before income taxes.  
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The FASB addressed assets to be disposed of in this statement to lower managers’ 
opportunity to manage their firms’ earnings. That is, an entity could potentially avoid the 
recognition of an impairment loss for assets otherwise subject to an impairment 
writedown by declaring that those assets are for sale (FASB, 1995, par 47).  
2.12 Effective Date and Transition 
“This statement shall be effective for financial statements for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1995. Earlier application is encouraged. Restatement of 
previously issued financial statements is not permitted” (FASB, 1995, par 34).  
2.13 Future of SFAS No. 121 
In June 2000, the FASB published an Exposure Draft of a proposed statement of 
financial accounting standards titled “Accounting for Impairment or Disposal of Long-
Lived Assets and for Obligations Associated with Disposal Activities.”  There are two 
primary objectives of this proposed statement. The first is to address significant issues 
relating to the implementation of SFAS No. 121. Some of these issues are as follows: 
1. How to apply the provisions for long-lived assets to be held and used to a long-
lived asset that an entity expects to sell or otherwise dispose of if the entity has 
not yet committed to a plan to sell or otherwise dispose of the asset. 
  
2. How to determine whether there is an “indicated impairment of value” of a 
long-lived asset to be exchanged for a similar productive long-lived asset or to 
be distributed to owners. 
 
3. What criteria must be met to classify a long-lived asset as “held for sale” and 
how to account for the asset if those criteria are met after the balance sheet date, 
but before issuance of the financial statements. 
 
4. How to account for a long-lived asset classified as held for sale if the plan to 




5. How to display, in the income statement, the results of operations during the 
holding period of a long-lived asset classified as held for sale with separately 
identifiable operations. 
 
6. How to display, in the statement of financial position, a long-lived asset or a 
group of long-lived assets and related liabilities classified as “held for sale” 
(FASB 2000).  
 
The second objective is to develop a single accounting model for “long-lived assets 
to be disposed of in order to address inconsistencies in accounting for such assets. That 
is, it will establish a single accounting model for long-lived assets to be disposed of, 
including segments of a business previously covered by APB30, and for certain 
obligations associated with a disposal activity (FASB 2000).  
The proposed statement recommends some changes to SFAS No. 121. It would 
require that estimates of future cash flows used to test an asset for recoverability be 
developed using an expected cash flow approach. It would also require that estimates of 
future cash flows used to test an asset (group) for recoverability be developed for the 
remaining useful life of the asset or, if assets having different remaining useful lives are 
grouped, for the remaining useful life of the primary asset of the group. It would require 
that an asset to be disposed of by sale be classified as “held for sale” when the proposed 
criteria for a qualifying plan of sale are met. The proposed statement would extend the 
reporting of discontinued operations to all significant components of an entity, including, 
but not limited to, segments of a business as previously defined in APB30. In addition, 
the proposed statement would provide guidance for recognition of a liability for 
obligations associated with a disposal activity that arises from an entity’s commitment to 
a plan to a) dispose of an asset (group) and b) discontinue an existing activity, whether or 
not the discontinuance involves the disposal of an asset (group) (FASB 2000). 
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The proposed statement would supersede SFAS No. 121.  It would, however, 
retain the fundamental recognition and measurement provisions of SFAS No. 121 for 
“assets to be held and used” and the fundamental measurement provisions of that 
statement for “assets to be disposed of by sale.” This proposed statement would also 
supersede the accounting and reporting provisions of APB30, which address the disposal 
of a segment of a business (FASB 2000). 
In the next chapter, this study presents a review of the asset writedown literature 








In this chapter, this study will present a literature review for asset writedown and 
earnings management literature related to asset writedowns. 
3.1 Asset Writedowns Literature Review 
3.1.1 Introduction 
This section includes a review of the literature of asset writedowns. The term 
“writedown” refers to both complete and partial downward asset revaluations and the 
following terms may be used synonymously: asset write-offs, asset writedowns, and asset 
impairments. This review presents the effect of asset writedowns on firms’ earnings and 
returns, the literature that studies managerial incentives behind the timing and amount of 
the asset writedowns, and it concludes with a summary of the major findings from the 
asset writedown literature.  
3.1.2 Asset Writedowns: Impairment or Manipulation 
Francis et al. (1996) examined the stock price response to the announcements of 
both the total amount of asset writedowns and the amounts of individual asset types that 
were written down. They wanted to determine whether asset writedown decisions were 
driven primarily by managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings or by changes in the 
economic circumstances of the firm. 
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Their study provided evidence on whether the manipulation factors or impairment 
factors drive writedown decisions and whether market reactions to writedowns depend on 
these factors. The proxies for managerial incentives they used were: 1) a change in top 
management around the time of the writedown, 2) whether the firm’s pre-writedown 
return on assets was better or worse than the return on assets for the prior year, and 3) a 
history of writedowns measured as the number of years the firm had writedowns out of 
the preceding five years. The proxies for asset impairment were: 1) past stock price 
performance, 2) book to market ratios, and 3) the historical performance of the firm’s 
industry. They used a sample of 674 writedown announcements made during the period 
1989-1992. For each year, the authors matched the set of writedown firms with an equal 
number of randomly selected non-writedown firms. Using a weighted Tobit model, they 
found that both factors were important determinants. However, when they analyzed 
writedowns by type (inventory; goodwill; property, plant, and equipment (PP&E); and 
restructuring changes), they found that managerial incentives play little or no role in 
determining inventory and PP&E write-offs, but play a substantial role in explaining 
other, more discretionary items, such as goodwill writedowns and restructuring charges 
writeoff. While the results show that, on average, investors viewed writedowns as 
negative news, there were significant differences in market responses across the types of 
writedowns. Francis et al. (1996) found support for the contention that writedowns were 
being used to manage earnings, similar to the findings of Zucca and Campbell (1992). 
Strong and Meyer (1987) asserted that managerial incentives play a major role in 




3.1.3 Market-Adjusted Security Returns Behavior 
Three possible market reactions exist to the announcement of asset writedowns. 
The no-effects hypothesis asserts that these writedowns are expected based on existing 
information or that they lack economic significance. The bad news hypothesis counters 
that the asset writedowns disclosures reveal a situation that is worse than expected by 
investors and would be associated with declining share prices and negative adjusted 
returns. The good news hypothesis predicts positive returns. It suggests that these 
writedowns are seen as part of effective management responses to worsening economic 
circumstances.  
Elliott and Shaw (1988) analyzed the earnings performance and the return 
behavior of firms that disclose writedowns from both a long-term and a short-term 
perspective. The long-term perspective observes the economic conditions under which 
such writedowns occur. The short-term perspective helps in assessing the information 
content of the disclosures. They examined return behavior at the date of the 
announcement of the writedown to distinguish between alternative views of the event. 
Their sample contained 240 firms that took asset writedowns during 1982-1985. They 
chose firms from Compustat that had negative “special items” in their income statements 
exceeding 1% of total assets, and then they excluded firms with non-discretionary 
writedowns, such as inventory and receivable adjustments. Their findings indicated that 
firms disclosing large discretionary writedowns were larger than other firms in their 
industries (revenues and assets) and were more highly leveraged. Firms with large 
writedowns substantially underperform their industries in the years preceding and 
including the write-off year in terms of return on assets and return on equity. These 
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declining performances in accounting terms were associated with significantly lower 
security returns in periods three years before, coincident with, and the year and a half 
following, the announcement of the writedown. That is, in the months following the 
writedown, industry-adjusted returns remained negative. Moreover, Elliott and Shaw 
(1988) documented a significant one- and two-day industry-adjusted negative share 
return on average when the writedowns were disclosed. After controlling for other 
unexpected components of earnings, the cross-sectional variation in these returns is 
associated with the relative size of the writedown. The magnitude of these industry-
adjusted two-day returns was also systematically related to other disclosures, including 
earnings.  
Zucca and Campbell (1992) examined 77 writedowns taken by 67 firms from 
1978 through 1983. They examined the average market-adjusted stock returns of the 
writedown firms for the 120 days surrounding the writedown announcement and found 
that there was no significant evidence of positive stock market reaction to the writedown 
announcement. Therefore, Zucca and Campbell (1992) and Elliott and Shaw (1988) 
respectively suggest that discretionary writedowns are either “no news” or “bad news.” 
Strong and Meyer (1987) examined a sample of 120 firms announcing asset 
writedowns during the period 1981-1985. For each writedown firm, they compared the 
financial performance of the firm prior to the writedown to the average performance of a 
control group of firms in the same industry that did not announce writedowns during 
1981-1985. They found that the most important determinant of a writedown decision was 
apparently a change in senior management, especially if the new chief executive comes 
from outside the company. That is, during executive transition, senior management was 
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motivated to take large asset writedowns, believing that the higher reported earnings in 
future periods would strengthen the perception of management effectiveness. This 
reasoning was supported by their findings that there was a statistically insignificant 
average cumulative abnormal return prior to the announcement of asset writedowns and a 
statistically significant positive average cumulative abnormal return after the 
announcements. Therefore, Strong and Meyer (1987) suggest that discretionary 
writedowns are seen as “good news.”  
Frantz (1999) further supports these results. This study developed a model that 
predicted that firms that report discretionary writedowns should experience, on average, 
positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of the discretionary 
writedowns. It interprets the positive abnormal returns as “good news.” Frantz’s model 
identifies managerial compensation plans as the economic incentive for reporting 
discretionary writedowns. It shows how discretionary writedowns may be used by 
managers to reveal private information about future earnings and how the financial 
market values the firm’s equity according to the reporting choice made by managers. 
Bunsis (1997) investigated whether the cash flow implications of writedown 
announcements lead to stock market reactions that are consistent with those implications. 
This study hypothesized that the nature of the underlying transaction, which gave rise to 
the writedown, affects the market reaction to the announcement of an asset writedown. 
This study predicted that the market would react positively (negatively) to transactions 
that would result in increased (decreased) expected future cash flows. This study is the 
first to link cash flows to stock market reaction in the context of asset writedown 
announcements. Bunsis examined 207 writedowns announced during 1983-1989. Bunsis 
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regressed the two-day announcement period returns on the amount of the writedown and 
the change relative to the prior year in quarterly net income. Results indicate that the 
larger the writedown, the more negative the two-day return. The results are similar to 
those of Elliott and Shaw (1988). Firms whose writedowns were classified as increasing 
(decreasing) expected future cash flows had positive (negative) market-adjusted returns 
for the two-day period (days 0,1)2 around the writedown announcement. Bunsis 
concluded that the market does not react to all writedowns in a similar manner, but 
considers the cash flow implications of the events surrounding the writedown. 
3.1.4 Repeated Accounting Asset Writedowns 
Elliott and Hanna (1996) examined the information content of earnings 
conditional on the presence of large and repeated accounting writedowns by using stock 
price reactions at earnings announcement dates. Their analysis of the valuation 
implications of writedowns examines the weights that investors attach to the unexpected 
portions of earnings before the impact of writedowns and the weights attached to the 
writedowns themselves. Using quarterly Compustat data from 1970-1994, they obtained a 
sample of 2,761 firms that report at least one special item during the period. The sample 
consisted of 101,046 fiscal firm-quarters, 6,073 of which included a special item. The 
authors assumed that all special items in the Compustat were asset writedowns, which 
weakens their results concerning asset impairment. To determine the impact of repeated 
writedowns on the information content of earnings, the authors examined the change in 
the earnings response coefficient as a firm took more writedowns in sequence. They 
                                                
2 Day 0 is the day of the event. 
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regressed two-day market-adjusted returns on “unexpected earnings before writedowns” 
and “asset writedowns.”  They found that the “unexpected earnings before writedowns” 
were more important than were the “unexpected earnings after writedowns” in explaining 
market-adjusted security returns. Although this result indicates that investors focus more 
on pre-writedown earnings, they also find a significant relationship between the amount 
of the writedown loss and the movement in market-adjusted share prices around earnings 
announcements. Moreover, the information content of both “earnings before asset 
writedowns” and “asset writedowns” is impaired when a firm reports sequences of large 
asset writedowns. Specifically, as firms choose to report more asset writedowns, the 
relationship between “earnings before asset writedowns” and stock returns weakens, and 
the value relevance of “asset writedown loss” decreases. 
3.1.5 Asset Writedowns and Concurrent Abnormal Accruals 
In assessing whether firms systematically manage earnings in the year of the 
writedown, Rees et al. (1996) investigated abnormal accruals of firms recognizing 
permanent asset impairments in their financial statements. Their study used a sample of 
277 firms taking 365 writedowns between 1987 and 1992. A modified version of the 
Jones (1991) model, based on Dechow et al. (1995), was used to estimate normal 
accruals. They found that abnormal accruals in the year of the asset writedown were 
significantly negative. In addition, the sample firms’ earnings before the writedown were, 
on average, significantly negative relative to their industry medians. These results 
suggested that management acts opportunistically in the year of the writedown to 
improve future years’ reported earnings. However, through additional analysis, Rees et 
al. (1996) suggested that firms have experienced a permanent shift in their accrual 
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balances in the writedown year, since the abnormal accruals in the writedown year do not 
reverse in subsequent years. The authors interpreted their findings as evidence that, 
instead of equating earnings management with opportunistic behavior, they considered 
the possibility that managers use their discretion to provide value-relevant signals to 
investors. 
3.1.6 Summary 
In summary, the asset writedown literature is based on the notion that the asset 
writedown decisions have a high degree of managerial discretion. This is, generally, due 
to the lack of authoritative guidance (prior to SFAS No.121) that governs the asset 
impairment practice in the business community. Therefore, after the issuance of SFAS 
No.121, it is important to assess the degree of discretion that remains with management 
for asset writedown decisions in order to utilize the previous literature and to guide the 
asset writedown studies in the future.   
Based on the review of the prior asset writedown literature, the following 
conclusions can be reached. Writedowns are used partially to manage earnings. 
Moreover, in the year of the asset writedown, abnormal accruals, which are used to 
manage earnings, are significantly negative in order to lower earnings (Rees et al. 1996). 
The more discretion that management has over accounting reporting, the more likelihood 
that they will use the opportunity to accomplish strategic earnings management 
objectives, e.g., maximizing the bonus plans benefits. However, incentives play little or 
no role in less discretionary items such as inventory, but they play a substantial role in 
explaining more discretionary items such as goodwill writedowns (e.g., Francis et al. 
1996, and Strong and Meyer 1987).  
 
 35
Conclusions related to earnings and abnormal returns behavior before asset 
writedowns are mixed. Some studies, such as, Fried et al. (1989) and Burton and Miller 
(1986), assert that earnings before asset writedowns are significantly negative. Others, 
such as, Zucca and Campbell (1992), observe that some firms wrote down their assets in 
a period with unusually high earnings. Similarly, in some studies, such as, Strong and 
Meyer (1987) and Frantz (1999), the abnormal adjusted returns during the writedown 
announcement are positive, and in other studies, such as, Elliott and Shaw (1988), are 
negative. Moreover, firms whose writedowns were classified as increasing (decreasing) 
expected future cash flows had positive (negative) market-adjusted returns for the two-
day period (days 0,1) around the writedown announcement (Bunsis 1997). Investors in 
certain situations view writedowns as negative or “bad” news but in other situations they 
view them as positive or “good” news. Investors might counter the asset writedowns 
disclosures as a situation that is worse than expected that would be associated with 
declining share prices and negative adjusted returns. In other situations, these writedowns 
might be seen as part of effective management responses to worsening economic 
circumstances. The unexpected “earnings before writedowns” are more important than 
are the unexpected “earnings after the writedowns” in explaining market-adjusted returns 
(Elliott and Hanna 1996). Both are significant in explaining the excess returns. 
Nevertheless, the information content of both “earnings before writedowns” and “asset 
writedowns” is impaired when a firm reports sequences of large asset writedowns. 
Alciatore et al. (1998) believe that there are potential new opportunities for 
research related to asset writedowns after the issuance of SFAS No.121. They state that 
the new financial standard can be used as a setting for detecting any potential changes in 
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earnings management activities resulting from the change in the accounting rules. That is, 
the relative size of writedowns as well as their timeliness may change. Moreover, 
changes in the nature, timing, and amounts of writedowns could result in corresponding 
changes in the market reaction to them, which, in general, this study examines.   
3.2 Earnings Management and Asset Writedowns 
This section is a review of the literature on earnings management through the use 
of asset writedowns and managerial incentives behind the timing and magnitude of these 
writedowns. 
3.2.1 Introduction 
Earnings management is the intentional intervention in the external financial 
reporting process with the intent of obtaining some private gains (Schipper 1989). It is a 
process of taking deliberate steps within the constraints of generally accepted accounting 
principles to bring about a desired level of reported earnings. “It occurs when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial 
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance 
of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (Healy and Wahlen 1998, p.6).  
Managing income numbers is hardly a recent phenomenon. As early as the 1930s, 
firms routinely would write down long-lived assets to accommodate the amortization 
needed to achieve some target income (Bitner and Dolan 1998). Over the last three 
decades earnings management has been analyzed in various ways. Several studies have 
focused on three issues: a) whether firms actually manage income; b) the managing 
ability of various accounting techniques; and c) conditions under which earnings 
 
 37
management is effective. In analyzing earnings management, those earnings management 
studies have focused on a) objectives of earnings management (management 
motivations), b) objects of earnings management (operating income, net income), c) 
diminutions of earnings management (real or artificial), d) earnings management tools 
(i.e., extraordinary items, accounting accruals), and e) earnings management techniques 
(“big bath” or “income smoothing”) (Ronen and Sadan, 1981). 
3.2.2 Objectives of Earnings Management 
The earnings management literature specifies two reasons why management 
manipulates its firm's earnings (e.g., Rees et al. 1996; Alciatore et al. 1998; and Guay et 
al. 1996). The performance measure hypothesis states that management uses earnings 
management tools in order to help it to produce a reliable and more timely measure of 
firm performance than using nondiscretionary tools alone. Under this hypothesis, 
management takes write-offs, not to manipulate earnings, but either to reflect declines in 
the values of assets due to poor firm performance, actions taken by competitors, changes 
in the economic climate, or changes in management strategies; or to provide value-
relevant signals to investors that future earnings will improve and better times are ahead 
and that “past problems are being dealt with” (Alciatore et al. 1998). For example, recent 
evidence suggests that executive turnover may spark periods of earnings management 
(Bitner and Dolan 1998). In this setting, earnings shifted to the near future can be touted 
as evidence of the new manager's effectiveness. 
The other earnings management objective is the opportunistic management 
hypothesis. Management uses earnings management tools to hide poor performance or to 
postpone a portion of unusually good current earnings to future years (Healy 1985; and 
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DeAngelo 1988). Under this hypothesis, managers are assumed to maximize their own 
wealth (Beattie et al. 1994). Watts and Zimmerman (1986), for example, have proposed 
that management has incentives to use techniques (such as big bath) to reduce reported 
earnings further so that future earnings (and bonuses) are increased. Performance-related 
cash bonuses, employment risk arising from the possibility of company failure or 
takeover, and the firm’s share value are some reasons that encourage the opportunistic 
behavior practiced by managers. Managers who are holding firm’s shares might have 
incentives to make choices that maximize the firm value (Beattie et al. 1994). Therefore, 
it is not necessarily that the opportunistic behavior practiced by managers would 
negatively affect other stakeholders. 
3.2.3 Techniques of Earnings Management 
Earnings management encompasses income smoothing behavior but also includes 
any attempt to alter reported income that would not occur unless management were 
concerned with the financial reporting implications. Earnings management literature 
generally tests two techniques: the “income smoothing” and the “big bath”. These tests 
are performed within many different contexts such as management buyouts, change in 
accounting principle, litigation, and sudden product increase, and restructuring.  
Income smoothing can be defined as the purposeful intervention in the process of 
reporting income numbers with the objective of dampening the fluctuations of those 
numbers around their trend (Bitner and Dolan 1998 and Moses 1987). Various reasons 
have been suggested as to why managers might attempt to smooth earnings. They may 
believe that smooth earnings are more highly valued or smooth earnings minimize the 
risk of possible debt and dividend covenant violations. That is, smooth income creates an 
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impression of reduced risk in the eyes of the participants in the financial markets. 
Theoretically, the reward for this impression can be a lower cost of capital and thus a 
higher market valuation. 
“Big bath” accounting has emerged, unequivocally, as a managerial technique. 
The financial community has coined the phrase “big bath” as a generic label that 
highlights the magnitude of some of the writedowns and similar tools that leads to 
cleansing of financial statements (Elliott and Shaw 1988). Big bath accounting has been 
used to describe large-profit reducing writedowns or “income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals” in income statements (Walsh et al. 1991). An immediate benefit of big bath 
accounting is to make the vital equity numbers look better in future periods. It is a case of 
clearing the decks so that a company can show a rapid increase in earnings. Managers 
have been observed making large writedowns more frequently in order to create an 
advantageous financial base conducive to enhancing rates of return in subsequent years.  
3.2.4 Earnings Management Tools 
There are many different tools by which managers manipulate earnings. Managers 
might use accruals, change in accounting method, and change in capital structure (Jones 
1991). “Accrual management refers to changing estimates such as useful lives, 
collectability of receivables, and other yearend accruals to try to alter reported earnings in 
the direction of a desired target” (Ayres 1994, p.28). While accrual management often is 
difficult to observe directly, analysis of patterns in accruals may reveal that the cash flow 




A second tool of earnings management involves the timing of adoption of 
mandatory accounting policies. Typically, the FASB standards are enacted with a two-to 
three-year transition period prior to mandatory adoption, but with early adoption 
encouraged. While not all firms are affected by each standard issued, the relative 
frequency of new standards, combined with long adoption windows, provides an 
opportunity for managers to select an adoption year most favorable to the firm's financial 
picture. For example, adoption of SFAS No. 52: Accounting for Foreign Currency 
Translation gave the early-adopting firms (in 1981) the opportunity to increase earnings 
an average of $.38 per share, or about 11% of pre-change earnings (Ayres, 1994). 
Another tool of managing earnings is to switch from one generally accepted 
accounting method to another. While a firm cannot make the same type of accounting 
method changes too frequently, it is possible to make several different types of 
accounting changes either together or individually over several periods.  
3.2.5 Diminutions of Earnings Management 
Broadly defined, earnings management falls into two categories: artificial 
earnings management and real earnings management (Bitner and Dolan 1998). Artificial 
earnings management is achieved by using discretionary accounting procedures that 
permit shifting costs and/or revenues from one accounting period to another. The use and 
effects of artificial earnings management vehicles typically are disclosed in the financial 
statements, thus making artificial smoothing relatively easy to detect.  
A variety of specific actions can facilitate artificial earnings management, but 
generally either accounting procedures or accounting estimates deviate from what one 
would regard as those producing the "proper" matching of income and expense items. 
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Examples of changes in accounting procedures would include changes in methods of 
inventory valuation and depreciation. Changes in accounting estimates may involve 
decisions surrounding bad debts, capital asset lives, litigation costs, obsolete inventory, or 
pension assumptions.  
Real earnings management, as the name implies, involves altering the timing of 
the occurrence of real transactions to achieve the earnings management objective. It also 
relates to the amount at which the transaction is reported. Timing the recognition of a 
transaction might be considered as a special case of real earnings management. These 
transactions include capital asset acquisitions; discretionary spending on advertising, 
research, and maintenance; or the recognition of sales transactions. Implementation of 
real earnings management is much broader based than artificial earnings management, 
because managers at all levels have some authority to execute these decisions.  
3.2.6 Asset Writedowns and Earnings Management 
As discussed earlier, there are a number of reasons why management might adjust 
earnings in such a way that the adjustment might have either a positive or negative effect 
on users’ ability to predict a firm’s performance. One technique that explains 
management incentive in managing earnings through the use of asset writedowns is the 
“big bath” hypothesis. Strong and Meyer (1987) argue that through cleaning up the 
balance sheet and reducing equity, a company can boost future profits and increase per-
share return. Furthermore, they argue that a single large writedown might signal that past 
problems have been dealt with aggressively, while a lingering series of writedowns 
would erode confidence in management and induce declines in a firm’s stock price. 
Cameron and Stephens (1991) support this argument by stating that management might 
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choose to take all negative adjustments to income in one year in an effort to “clear” the 
accounting records. By taking significant writedowns all in one year, management could 
be signaling that better times are ahead. In the case of asset writedowns, this reasoning is 
particularly appropriate, since an asset writedown results in decreased depreciation 
expense in the future. Moreover, a number of analysts have argued that “the bigger the 
bath, the better” (Strong and Meyer 1987). Fried et al. (1989) found that both turnover 
and profitability ratios deteriorated prior to an asset writedown but that, after the 
writedown, stock performance tended to improve. In addition, Strong and Meyer (1987) 
found that, the larger the writedown relative to book equity, the greater the announcement 
period excess return. This result lends support to the notion of ‘the bigger the bath, the 
better.” They found statistically significant positive average cumulative accounting 
returns after the announcement. The “big bath” hypothesis has been mentioned often as 
an earnings management technique that is used to accomplish a desired objective from 
recording asset writedowns; for instance, Mime (1986) and Burton and Miller (1986). 
Income smoothing is another technique that explains management incentive in 
managing earnings through the use of asset writedowns. It describes an earnings pattern 
in which management aspires to maintain a steady and predictable rate of earnings 
growth. Management may try to record discretionary gains, losses, or accruals in the 
period that will best help them to attain their goal of steady growth. Therefore, a firm 
with an impaired asset might choose to adjust earnings downward in a year when 
earnings from ongoing operations are unusually high but are not expected to be as high in 
future years, or it may time the loss recognition to coincide with a non-discretionary gain. 
In this manner, management could smooth income and increase predictability of a firm’s 
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performance. Foster (1986) states that one possible reason for income smoothing 
behavior is that managers adjust earnings in the belief that a consistent trend and lower 
variability in earnings increase investor interest since they indicate a lower level of risk. 
A thorough summary of the income smoothing literature has been developed by Ronen 
and Sadan (1981). Zucca and Campbell (1992) found that the majority of the firms wrote 
down their assets in a period of already below normal earnings (the “big bath” 
hypothesis), but 25% offset the writedown with other gains or unusually high earnings 
(the “income smoothing” hypothesis).  
Cameron and Stephens (1991) state that the characteristics associated with 
positive non-recurring adjustments versus negative non-recurring adjustments to income 
are not known clearly. They believe that negative adjustments to income are following 
the “big bath” theory, while positive adjustments are used to smooth income into a 
consistent pattern in periods of negative unexpected earnings. They hypothesize that 
“forecast accuracy for firms with negative adjustments to income is less than for firms 
with positive adjustments” (Cameron and Stephens 1991, p.85). Under income smoothing 
theory, forecast accuracy is higher than under “big bath” theory, since earnings follow a 
consistent pattern. They find that firms with negative adjustments to income produce less 
accurate forecasts than those with positive adjustments. These results support the idea 
that there may be different underlying motivations for taking negative adjustments to 
income compared to positive adjustments. That is, negative adjustments are following the 
“big bath” theory, while positive adjustments are used to smooth income into a consistent 
pattern. Zucca and Campbell (1992) emphasize that negative adjustments such as asset 
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writedowns not only follow the “big bath” theory, but also could be used to smooth 
income when there are positive unexpected earnings prior to the writedown.     
Heflin and Warfield (1997) studied the relation between earnings and stock-price 
changes among firms that have made writedowns. They investigated whether writedowns 
are overstated and whether they were recorded in a timely manner in order to manage 
future earnings. Their sample included 845 asset writedowns taken by 588 firms during 
1985-1991. They compared the financial performance of the writedown firms to that of 
an industry-matched non-writedown sample and regressed annual raw returns from 
periods prior to and contemporaneous with the writedowns on writedown and non-
writedown components of earnings. Writedown firms had significantly lower returns 
compared to industry peers for the writedown year and for the three years before it. In 
contrast, writedown firms’ earnings were generally greater than or equal to industry 
benchmarks for the three years before the writedown, but their pre-writedown earnings 
fell below industry levels in the writedown year. Moreover, they found that the 
writedown amounts were weakly correlated with contemporaneous returns and strongly 
correlated with prior year annual returns. Heflin and Warfield (1997) suggested that firms 
manage their earnings through delaying the recognition of an impending writedown until 
a year in which earnings were poor irrespective of the writedowns. Furthermore, they 
suggested that the market appears to devalue some of the firm’s assets well before the 
writedown period. They concluded that the decline in the value of the assets written off 






Earnings management is the intentional intervention in the external financial 
reporting process in order to obtain some private gains. Asset writedowns are used as one 
way to achieve some target income. There are two reasons of why management 
manipulates its corporate’s earnings: the performance measure hypothesis and the 
opportunistic management hypothesis. The former hypothesis states that management 
takes writedowns to reflect declines in the values of assets due to poor firm performance 
or to provide value-relevant signals to investors that future earnings will improve. The 
later hypothesis states that managers are assumed to maximize their own wealth by using 
techniques (such as big bath) to reduce reported earnings further so that future earnings 
are increased. Earnings management literature generally tests two techniques: “income 
smoothing” and the “big bath.” The objective of “income smoothing” is to dampen the 
fluctuations of reported income numbers around their trend, whereas the objective of “big 
bath” is to clear the records so that a company can show a rapid increase in earnings in 
the near future. It is found that asset writedown announcements have some information 
content that is reflected in a firm’s returns. That is, the larger the writedown relative to 
book equity, the greater the announcement period excess returns (Strong and Meyer 
1987). However, it is found that management records asset writedowns to manage 
corporate’s earnings. In periods of unexpected negative earnings, many firms are 
following the big bath technique by taking asset writedowns, while fewer firms are 
following the income smoothing technique by reporting asset writedowns in periods of 
unexpected positive earnings (Zucca and Campbell 1992). In the next chapter, this study 




RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter, three hypotheses are developed and discussed. In addition, the 
chapter presents the research methodology and discusses the regression models used to 
test the hypotheses. Also, the sample selection procedure and the single factor market 
model that is used to calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are discussed.  
4.1 Research Hypotheses 
The research questions are as follows: What are the effects of SFAS No.121 
on management’s discretion over asset writedown reporting? Are the effects of 
SFAS No.121 reflected in the stock market? Specifically, “Does SFAS 121 reduce 
the magnitude and restrict the timing of reporting assets writedowns?” and “Do the 
asset writedown losses that are reported post-SFAS No.121 have smaller/larger 
informational content (surprise element) as measured by the CAR during a three-
day event window relative to those pre-SFAS No.121?”  
Three hypotheses related to these research questions are developed and presented 
below. The first and second hypotheses examine the amount of asset writedown and the 
timing of asset writedowns. This study posits that the issuance of SFAS No.121 restricts 
management’s discretion over the magnitude of the reported asset impairment loss and 
the discretion over when to report such events. Earnings management can be seen as a 
possible explanation for the timing and amount of discretionary writedowns (Zucca and 
Campbell 1992). Two techniques can be used when managing earnings: “big bath” and 
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“income smoothing.” The unexpected earnings direction specifies which technique will 
be used when managing earnings. The “big bath” technique is adopted in periods of 
unexpected negative earnings, whereas the “income smoothing” technique is adopted in 
periods of unexpected positive earnings (Zucca and Campbell 1992).  
For firms faced with unexpected negative earnings (“big bath” firms), reporting 
additional asset writedown losses would lead to better accounting performance in future 
periods. By reporting asset writedowns in the current year, future depreciation expense 
would be reduced, which would increase the reported net income in the future years. 
Also, the return on asset ratio would increase in the future since the fixed asset amounts 
would decrease and earnings would increase. In addition, for firms faced with unexpected 
positive earnings (“income smoothing”), reporting more asset writedown losses also 
would lead to better accounting performance in future periods. Smoothing earnings and 
minimizing earnings fluctuations would result in lowering a firm’s perceived risk. With 
the adoption of management incentive plans that are structured based on the firm’s 
accomplishment of steady growth, managers would take higher asset writedowns 
whenever there are positive unexpected earnings. Pre-SFAS No.121, both of these 
earnings management techniques predict higher amounts of asset writedowns during 
periods of unexpected positive or negative earnings. However, post-SFAS No.121, 
management presumably would have less discretion in reporting higher amounts of asset 
writedown losses and in the timing of when to report asset writedowns since it provides 
some structure and rules that can be enforced by auditors. Therefore, it is expected that 
SFAS No.121 would reduce the average amount of asset writedowns. Hypothesis 1 
(stated in the alternative form) is as follows: 
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H1:   SFAS No.121 reduces the magnitude of asset writedowns relative to 
pre-SFAS No.121.  
 
In addition, based on Zucca and Campbell (1992), “income smoothing” is 
characterized by periods in which pre-writedown earnings are higher than expected. By 
recording asset writedowns during such periods, reported earnings will be closer to but 
not less than the level expected. A “big bath” is characterized by periods in which pre-
writedown earnings are below expected earnings. By recording asset writedowns during 
periods with unexpected negative earnings, reported earnings will be closer to but not 
more than the level expected. Therefore, “income smoothing” and “big bath” can be seen 
as two techniques that characterize the timing of when to report asset writedowns. 
Management might choose to adopt the “income smoothing” technique in one year and 
adopt the “big bath” technique in another year, depending on the direction of the 
unexpected earnings.   
Firms that adopt the “income smoothing” technique in one year will report asset 
writedowns whenever there are unexpected positive earnings in order to smooth earnings; 
whereas firms that adopt the “big bath” technique will report asset writedowns whenever 
there are unexpected negative earnings. Hence, if SFAS No.121 restricts management’s 
discretion over the timing of when to report asset writedowns, then the number of firms 
with negative (positive) unexpected earnings who have reported asset writedowns will be 
fewer post-SFAS No.121 than the number of firms who have negative (positive) 
unexpected earnings who have reported asset writedowns pre-SFAS No.121. Therefore, 
hypothesis 2 can be stated (in the alternative form) as follows: 
H2: SFAS No.121 restricts the timing of when to report asset writedowns such that 
the number of firms with negative (positive) unexpected earnings that have 
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reported asset writedowns will be fewer post-SFAS No.121 than the number of 
firms who have negative (positive) unexpected earnings that have reported asset 
writedowns pre-SFAS No.121. 
 
 The third hypothesis is related to the information content of asset 
writedown announcements in the short-term, and it has two parts. For “big bath” 
firms, it posits that SFAS No.121 will reduce the “surprise” that is reflected in 
CAR due to the unexpected larger asset writedown announcements. The 
authoritative guidance established by SFAS No.121 would make asset writedown 
announcements more in line with stockholders’ expectations due to the reduction 
in management’s discretion over asset writedowns. Stockholders will receive the 
asset writedown news with more confidence and perceived reliability since 
earnings management is reduced and asset writedowns are manipulated less. 
Asset writedown losses post-SFAS No.121 are expected to be smaller than those 
of pre-SFAS No.121.  This anticipation is expected to be reflected in the CAR.  
For “income smoothing” firms, however, SFAS No.121 might increase the 
“surprise” from the unexpected large asset writedown announcements. This might be due 
to the reduction in the ability to smooth earnings that was used to reduce the fluctuation 
in earnings. Therefore, it is expected that SFAS No.121 would result in more earnings 
fluctuation that might lead to a larger “surprise” in CAR. Thus, hypothesis 3 has two 
parts that can be stated in the alternative form as follows: 
H3a: During the three-day event window surrounding the release of the 
financial announcement of asset writedowns, cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of “big bath” firms reporting asset writedowns after 
the adoption of SFAS No.121 are smaller than those of “big bath” 





H3b: During the three-day event window surrounding the release of the 
financial announcement of asset writedowns, cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) of “income smoothing” firms reporting asset 
writedowns after the adoption of SFAS No.121 are larger than those 
of “income smoothing” firms reporting asset writedowns before the 
adoption of SFAS No.121. 
 
4.2 Research Methodology 
Three models are used in this analysis: the random-effects Tobit model, the binary 
dependent variable panel data model, and the traditional random-effects panel data 
model. This study provides a brief summary of each theoretical model prior to discussing 
each model that is used in testing each hypothesis. In the following section, a brief 
discussion of the random-effects Tobit model is provided; this model is applied in testing 
the first hypothesis.  
4.2.1 The Random-Effects Tobit Model 
A panel data model offers two distinct advantages over a traditional linear 
regression model. First, a panel data model is able to capture both cross-section and time-
series variation in the dependent variable under investigation. Second, a panel data model 
is able to measure, not only the effects that observable variables have on the dependent 
variable, but also the effects of relevant unobservable or non-measurable influences. 
Observable variables are incorporated into the model in the usual way. There are two 
means by which the unobservable variables are incorporated into the model: a Fixed–
Effect (FE) model and a Random–Effects (RE) model. In the RE model, the unobservable 
or non-measurable factors that differentiate cross-section units are assumed to be best 






where: “i” indexes cross-section units (in this case, firms that may take an asset 
writedown) such that i= 1,2,…,N; and “t” indexes time-series units (in this case, years 
1993 through 1997) such that t=1,2,….,T. The matrix Xit is of dimension (NT×K) and 
contains data on the observable explanatory variables of the model. The effects of 
relevant unobservable variables and time-invariant factors that characterize firm “i” in the 
model are captured by the (NT×1) vector ui. The stochastic disturbances of the model are 
captured by the (NT×1) vector itε . Since both ui and itε incorporate randomly distributed 
stochastic components of the model, one may combine these terms to form the composite 
error term as:  
itiit εuω +=  (4-2)
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The variable ∗itY  in equation (1) is a latent variable that represents an 
unobservable index of ability or desire to report a non-zero amount of asset writedown 
loss by firm “i” at year “t”. This study assumes that asset writedowns will take on a 
positive value if this measure of ability or desire is positive. Similarly, this study assumes 
that asset writedowns will take on a value of zero if this measure of ability or desire is 
zero or negative. As such, one may construct the observable left-censored dependent 



















A censored dependent variable is one that is not observed over a continuous range 
due to the underlying stochastic choice mechanism of the variable. The most common 
form of censoring is from below at zero. This is the case in which the dependent variable 
of a regression model can take on many zero observations as well as several positive 
continuous values. Since firms may report asset writedowns in some years and may not in 
other years, itY will contain a significant number of zero observations as well as many 
positive observations. Because of the censored nature of this dependent variable, it is 
necessary to use a random-effects Tobit (weighted maximum likelihood) estimation 
procedure to obtain unbiased, consistent, and efficient estimates of the parameters in 
vector β . From an econometric perspective, it is not appropriate simply to ignore the 
“zero” observations in the study’s sample and use only the positive (non-zero) values, 
because this means that the study does not use a truly random sample. This will make the 
model’s parameter estimates biased and inconsistent. Moreover, it is not appropriate to 
include the “zero” observations and simply use the ordinary least squares method (OLS) 
in estimation since this leads to further bias in the study’s results. These “zero” 
observations are masking the true underlying choice mechanism, and using OLS in this 
setting ignores this mechanism. Next, the specific model that is used in testing the asset 
writedown magnitude hypothesis is discussed. 
4.2.2 The Asset Writedown Magnitude Hypothesis (H1) 
The first hypothesis states that SFAS No.121 reduces the magnitude of asset 
writedowns relative to the magnitude of asset writedowns pre-SFAS No.121.  The 
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following Random-Effects Tobit model that uses censored dependent variable is 
used to test the hypothesis: 
WDMit = α0 + α1 AEit +α2 FAS121it + ui +εit  (4-5)
Where: 
 WDMit = Asset writedown magnitude (dollar amount) for firm “i” in year “t”. 
 itAE  = Reported accounting earnings excluding the asset writedown loss 
for firm “i” in year “t”. 
 FAS121it = 1 if the observation for firm “i” collected in year “t” is subject to 
the rules of SFAS No.121, and 0 if not. 
 ui = A firm-specific random variable that encompasses unobservable, 
time-invariant factors that differentiate firms.  
 εit = The error term of the regression model. 
 
The variables WDMit and AEit are deflated by the total assets of the same year (t). 
The null and alternative hypotheses of interest are: 
H0: α2 = 0 
H1: α2 < 0 
If the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative, this would suggest that 
SFAS No.121 mitigates the magnitude of asset writedowns. This result would be 
consistent with the notion that SFAS No.121 has restricted management’s discretion 
regarding the magnitude of asset writedowns.  
In the following section, a brief discussion of the binary dependent variable panel 
data model is provided; this model is applied in testing the second hypothesis.  
4.2.3 The Binary Dependent Variable Panel Data Model 
Dependent variables may be qualitative or quantitative in nature, depending on 
the type of research question that is under investigation. Qualitative dependent variables 
 
 54
take on discrete (integer) values. A binary dependent variable is one example of this type 
of variable. This type of variable takes on two values, 0 or 1. The general form of a 
binary model is as given below: 
itiitit εuβXY ++=
∗  (4-6)
Where: “i” indexes cross-section units (in this case, firms) such that i= 1,2,…,N; 
and “t” indexes time-series units such that t=1,2,….,T. The matrix Xit is of dimension (NT 
× K) and contains data on the observable explanatory variables of the model. The effects 
of relevant unobservable variables, time-invariant factors that characterize firm “i” in the 
model, are captured by the (NT × 1) vector ui. The stochastic disturbances of the model 
are captured by the (NT × 1) vector itε . The dependent variable, 
∗
itY , is a continuous but 
unobservable index of utility, ability, or desire. In this study, for example, ∗itY represents 
the desire of firm “i” to report a non-zero amount of asset writedown loss at time “t”. It is 
also assumed that there exists a dichotomous realization of the dependent variable ∗itY , 


















That is, Yit takes on a value of 1 if firm “i” has a positive desire to report asset writedown 
losses at time “t”, and Yit takes on a value of 0 if firm “i” has no desire or negative desire 
to report asset writedown losses at time “t”.  
It is assumed that the error term of equation (4-6) follows a normal distribution 
since the dependent variable, ∗itY , is continuous. In this case, the Maximum Likelihood 
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Probit estimation procedure is used. Since the observable dependent variable Yit is binary, 
it is not appropriate from an econometric viewpoint to use OLS to estimate the model’s 
parameters. This is because the error variance produced by an OLS regression applied to 
such a model will be heteroskedastic. In addition, t-tests and F-tests cannot be 
constructed if OLS is used in estimation of such a model since the error term will not be 
normally distributed.  
The specific binary dependent variable panel data model that is applied in testing 
the second hypothesis is now presented. 
4.2.4 The Asset Writedown Timing Hypothesis (H2) 
Earnings management is examined as a possible explanation for the timing of 
discretionary writedowns. Hypothesis 2 states that SFAS No.121 restricts the timing of 
reporting asset writedowns such that the number of firms with negative (positive) 
unexpected earnings that have reported asset writedowns will be fewer post-SFAS 
No.121 than the number of firms with negative (positive) unexpected earnings that have 
reported asset writedowns pre-SFAS No.121. The following binary dependent panel data 
model is used to test hypothesis 2: 




 itWD         = 1 if firm “i” reports asset writedowns in year "t", and 0 
otherwise. 
 FAS121it   = 1 if the observation collected in year “t” for firm “i” is subject 
to the rules of SFAS No.121, and 0 if not. 
 itBB  = 1 if firm “i” has negative unexpected earnings (a “big bath” 
firm) in year “t”, and 0 if firm “i” has positive unexpected 
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earnings (an “income smoothing” firm) in year “t”. 
 itAE  = Reported accounting earnings excluding the writedown loss for 
firm “i” in year “t”. 
 ui               = A firm-specific random variable that encompasses unobservable, 
time-invariant factors that differentiate firms.  
 εit = The error term of the regression model. 
           WDMit and AEit are deflated by the total assets of the same year (t). 
 
Based on Zucca and Campbell (1992), “income smoothing” is characterized by 
periods in which pre-writedown earnings are higher than expected. By recording the 
writedown, reported earnings are closer to but not less than the level expected. A “big 
bath” is characterized by periods in which pre-writedown earnings are below expected 
earnings. Therefore, “income smoothing” and “big bath” can be seen as two techniques 
that characterize the timing of asset writedown reporting. “Income smoothing” firms are 
expected to report asset writedowns whenever there are positive unexpected earnings in 
order to smooth earnings. Similarly, “big bath” firms will report asset writedowns 
whenever there are negative unexpected earnings. Hence, if SFAS No.121 restricts 
management’s discretion over the timing of reporting asset writedowns, firms with 
negative (positive) unexpected earnings that have reported asset writedowns post-SFAS 
No.121 will be fewer than firms with unexpected negative (positive) earnings that report 
asset writedowns pre-SFAS No.121.  
In order to test hypothesis 2, the following averages for “big bath” firms are 
calculated: 
•  The average number of “big bath” firms (independent of accounting earnings) 
that wrote down assets after the issuance of SFAS No.121= E [WD | 




•  The average number of “big bath” firms (independent of accounting earnings) 
that wrote down assets before the issuance of SFAS No.121= E [WD | 
FAS121=0 and BB=1]= (β0+ β2). 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses for “big bath” firms are: 
H0: (β0+ β1+ β2) ≥ (β0+ β2) 
H1: (β0+ β1+ β2) < (β0+ β2) 
Therefore, if the average number of “big bath” firms that wrote down assets post-
SFAS No.121 is smaller than the average number of “big bath” firms that wrote down 
assets pre-SFAS No.121, this would suggest that, for “big bath” firms, SFAS No.121 
restricts management’s discretion over timing when asset writedowns are reported. That 
is, if SFAS No.121 restricts the timing of reporting asset writedowns and decreases the 
timing discretion that managers have, then, after the issuance of SFAS No.121, the 
average number of firms that report asset writedowns and experience negative 
unexpected earnings (NUE) will be smaller than the average number of firms that report 
asset writedowns and experience NUE pre-SFAS No.121.  
Similarly, the following averages for “income smoothing” firms are calculated: 
•  The average number of “income smoothing” firms (independent of accounting 
earnings) that wrote down assets after the issuance of SFAS No.121= E [WD | 
FAS121=1 and BB=0]= (β0+ β1). 
 
•  The average number of “income smoothing” firms (independent of accounting 
earnings) that wrote down assets before the issuance of SFAS No.121= E [WD | 
FAS121=0 and BB=0]= (β0).  
 
The null and alternative hypothesis for “income smoothing” firms are: 
H0: (β0+ β1) ≥  (β0) 
H1: (β0+ β1) < (β0) 
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If the average number of “income smoothing” firms that wrote down assets post- 
SFAS No.121 is smaller than the average number of “income smoothing” firms that 
wrote down assets pre-SFAS No.121, then the results would be consistent with the notion 
that SFAS No.121 also restricts the timing of reporting asset writedowns for “income 
smoothing” purposes. Firms that adopt the “income smoothing” technique will take asset 
writedowns whenever unexpected earnings are positive (Zucca and Campbell 1992). If 
SFAS No.121 restricts the timing of reporting asset writedowns for “income smoothing” 
firms after the issuance of SFAS No.121, the average number of firms that report asset 
writedowns and experience positive unexpected earnings (PUE) will be smaller than the 
average number of firms that report asset writedowns and experience PUE before SFAS 
No.121. Managers will not have the degree of timing discretion that they had before the 
issuance of SFAS No.121; that is, they will not have the same ability to decrease the 
magnitude of the PUE in order to smooth their firms’ earnings.   
“Expected earnings” are calculated by using a random walk model similar to 
Zucca and Campbell (1992) and Elliott and Hanna (1996). The random walk model 
assumes that, on average, the use of last period’s reported earnings as a prediction of the 
current period’s earnings is at least as good as any other model. This measure of expected 
earnings is compared to the reported earnings for each firm in the period in which the 
writedown was recorded. The difference between the actual earnings and the expected 
earnings is the “unexpected earnings.”  
In the following section, a brief discussion of the traditional random-effects panel 
data model is provided; this model is applied in testing the asset writedown informational 
content hypothesis (H3).  
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4.2.5 The Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model: 
The random effects (RE) model incorporates both time-series and cross-sectional 
data. In this model, the unobservable or non-measurable factors that differentiate cross-
section units are assumed to be best characterized as randomly distributed variables. A 
general expression of the model may be given by the equation below:  
itiitit εuβXY ++= . (4-9)
where “i” indexes cross-section observations (firms) from 1 to N and “t” indexes time-
series observations from 1 to T. The vector Yit is of dimension (NT × 1) and contains 
observations on the dependent variable of the model (CAR for firm “i” in year “t” for the 
period (-1, 1) around the 10K or AR release date). The matrix Xit is of dimension (NT × 
K) and contains observations of the exogenous (independent) variables of interest. These 
variables are observed for each firm “i” in each time period “t”. The vector β  is of 
dimension (K × 1) and contains the parameters that measure the effects of the exogenous 
variables. The effects of relevant unobservable variables and time-invariant factors that 
characterize firm “i” in the model are captured by the (NT × 1) vector ui. The stochastic 
disturbances of the model are captured by the (NT × 1) vector itε . Since both ui and 
itε incorporate randomly distributed stochastic components of the model, the study may 
combine these terms to form the composite error term as:  
itiit εuω += . (4-10)
The composite error term is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean. 
Since the covariance structure of the composite error term is non-ideal, as described in 
equation (4-3), the Random-Effects model given by equation (4-9) is estimated via the 
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generalized least squares (GLS) procedure in order to obtain unbiased, consistent, and 
efficient parameter estimates of the β vector. The specific traditional random-effects 
panel data model that is applied in testing the third hypothesis is next. 
4.2.6 The Asset Writedown Informational Content Hypothesis (H3) 
Hypothesis 3 states that during the three-day event window surrounding the 
release of the financial announcement of asset writedowns, CAR of “big bath” (“income 
smoothing”) firms reporting asset writedowns after the adoption of SFAS No.121 are 
smaller (larger) than those of “big bath” (“income smoothing”) firms reporting asset 
writedowns before the adoption of SFAS No.121. The objective of this hypothesis test is 
not only to provide evidence of stock price reactions to asset writedown announcements, 
but also to test the effect of SFAS No.121 on CAR, if any, surrounding the asset 
writedown announcements. It is expected that SFAS No.121 will have different effects on 
firms, depending on which technique those firms adopted, i.e., “big bath” or “income 
smoothing.” The following RE model will be used to test the proposed hypothesis about 















CARit = The cumulative abnormal stock returns for firm “i” in year 
“t” for the three-day period (-1, 1) around the 10K or AR 
release date, where 0 is the 10K or Annual Report (AR) 
release date whichever comes earlier. 
UEit    = The unexpected earnings excluding the asset writedown 
loss using a random walk model for firm “i” in year “t”.  
WDBBPSTit    = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
negative unexpected earnings and negative net income (big 
bath) in year “t” that adopted SFAS No. 121. 
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WDBBPREit = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
negative unexpected earnings and negative net income (big 
bath) in year “t” before the adoption of SFAS No. 121. 
WDISPSTit = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
positive unexpected earnings and positive net income 
“income smoothing” in year “t” that adopted SFAS No. 
121. 
WDISPREi   = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
positive unexpected earnings and positive net income 
“income smoothing” in year “t” before the adoption of 
SFAS No. 121. 
WDOTHRPSit    = The assets writedown magnitude of firm “i” in year “t” that 
is neither a “big bath” or “income smoothing” firm that 
adopted SFAS No. 121. 
WDOTHRPRit = The assets writedown magnitude of firm “i” in year “t” that 
is neither a “big bath” or “income smoothing” firm before 
adopting SFAS No. 121. 
εit = The error term of the regression model. 
  
It is expected that SFAS No.121 will reduce the large “surprise” that was 
observed in CAR for “big bath” companies that report unexpected larger asset 
writedowns. The guidance provided by SFAS No.121 is expected to make the writedown 
announcements more consistent with stockholders’ expectations due to the reduction in 
management’s discretion over asset writedowns. Stockholders will receive the asset 
writedown news with more confidence and reliability since earnings management is 
reduced and asset writedowns are less manipulated. Therefore, the null and alternative 
hypotheses for the “big bath” firms are, respectively: 
H0: (γ2 - γ3) ≥ 0 
H1: (γ2 – γ3) < 0 
However, for “income smoothing” firms, the announcement of asset writedowns 
is used to smooth accounting earnings in order to establish an expected pattern of a firm’s 
growth. This pattern is expected to decrease the firm’s perceived risk and increase firm’s 
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stock price. If the guidance established by SFAS No.121 restricts the smoothing practice 
due to the reduction of management’s discretion over asset writedowns, then the earnings 
smoothing that was practiced should be reduced. Therefore, the “surprise” that is 
associated with asset writedown announcements is expected to increase since the 
stockholders would observe more of an unexpected fluctuation in the firm’s earnings 
post-SFAS No.121. Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses for the “income 
smoothing” firms are: 
H0: (γ4 - γ5) ≤0 
H1: (γ4 - γ5) > 0 
4.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
In order to calculate CAR over the three-day event window around the 10K or AR 
release date, the single factor market model is employed. The CAR is regressed on the 
variables of interest to assess whether asset writedown announcements have any new 
relevant information that is reflected in securities prices.  
The single factor market model is commonly used to measure the market reaction 
to an information signal by looking at the price reaction of the securities that may be 
affected by the information around the date of its announcement or disclosure (Henderson 
1990). If one observes an abnormal price reaction, it is concluded that the announcement 
or disclosure has provided new information to market participants. In this study, the 
information signal is the reporting of asset writedown losses. The abnormal return 
equation, using the single factor market model, is presented as follows: 
mtiiitit RBaRAR
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= The abnormal return during the three-day event window 
investigation period (-1, 1) for firm “i” in year “t”. 
 itR
 
= The return on firm “i” during the three-day event window 
investigation period (-1, 1) in year “t”. 
 mtR
 
= The return on the market index (m) during the three-day 
event window investigation period (-1, 1) in year “t”.  
 
The parameters, ia
  and iB

, are estimated from the market model using daily 
returns from the estimation period. Similar to Strong and Meyer (1987), the estimation 
period consists of 150 days prior to the 10K or AR release date, beginning from day –160 
to day –11. This is to ensure that any possible reaction to the information of asset 
writedown losses is not picked up in the parameter estimates. Assuming that expected 
security returns are generated by a single-index market model, the market model used to 
estimate the parameter coefficients of ai and Bi is defined as:  
Rit = ai + Bi Rmt + εit (4-13)
Where: 
 Rit = (Pit – Pit-1)/(Pit-1), security return for firm “i” at time “t”. 
 Pit = The security price of firm “i” adjusted for dividends, splits, and 
new offerings, at time “t”. 
 ai = Intercept of the linear relationship for firm “i”. 
 Bi = Parameter measuring the relationship between Rit and the 
independent variable, Rmt, for firm “i”. 
 Rmt = The return on Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) 
market index (m) at time “t”.  
 εit = Residual term of the return on securities for firm “i” at time “t”.  
  
The model applied to estimate the cumulative abnormal returns over the 
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Where: 
 itR  = The security return for firm “i” at time “t”. 
 
itR̂  = The predicted return for firm “i” at time “t”.  
  = 
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4.4 Sample Selection 
The sample for this study is obtained through a keyword search of 1993-1997 
SEC 10K’s contained in the Lexis/Nexis database. Generally, the years 1993 through 
1995 were years when asset writedowns were practiced without specific authoritative 
guidance; whereas 1996 and 1997 were years when asset writedowns were practiced 
following the guidance of SFAS No.121. The keyword search that is employed is: 
“IMPAIR! or WRIT! w/25 ASSET! and 10K.” The Compustat PC Plus database is used 
to specify other financial items that are needed to conduct the analysis for all firms that 
are specified in the Lexis/Nexis database. Furthermore, the CRSP database is used to 
estimate CARs around the three-day event window (-1, 1). Firms with all necessary 




CHAPTER FIVE  
RESEARCH FINDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
SFAS No. 121 was issued in response to the diverse practices in recognizing asset 
writedowns, as well as the increased frequency and large amounts of asset writedowns. 
Prior to the issuance of SFAS No.121, no explicit guidance existed in accounting for the 
impairment of long-lived assets. This absence of explicit guidance for asset impairments 
permitted substantial management discretion over the magnitude and timing of 
writedowns. SFAS No.121 was issued to reduce management’s discretion in reporting 
asset impairment in order to reduce earnings management (Francis et al. 1996). The 
FASB attempted to place some constraints on the practice of asset writedown reporting 
due to the fact that managers prefer to wait until earnings and stock performance for the 
fiscal year are known, in order to use this information in deciding whether or not to take a 
writedown (Alciatore et al. 1998). The FASB issued SFAS No.121 to minimize any 
possible management manipulation in accounting earnings.  Therefore, the issuance of 
SFAS No. 121 was expected to reduce or even eliminate management discretion in 
reporting asset impairment.  
From a different viewpoint, the issuance of SFAS No.121 was not expected to 
eliminate or reduce management discretion in the timing and amount of asset 
writedowns. Rees et al. (1996) and Munter (1995), among others, argued that although 
SFAS No.121 provides specific examples of changes in circumstances that indicate a 
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need for review of asset values, management’s estimates of future cash flows, for 
instance, determine whether a writedown is necessary. In addition, Zucca (1997) believes 
that there are some areas of SFAS No. 121 in which its application is subject to the 
judgment and assumptions of management, such as the definition of impairment 
indicators, the asset grouping level at which testing and measurement occur, and the 
depreciation methods chosen for the asset. Titard and Pariser (1996) state that the 
FASB’s approach in SFAS No.121 gives management substantial flexibility to exercise 
judgment in determining and reporting impairment losses. Therefore, reducing 
management discretion in the timing and amount of asset writedowns by the issuance of 
SFAS No.121 will not be achieved.  
This study investigates these two viewpoints and analyzes the effect of SFAS 
No.121 on asset impairment reporting. It investigates whether SFAS No.121 has 
decreased management’s discretion over asset writedown magnitude and timing. 
Moreover, this study investigates the short-term market reactions towards the 
announcement of asset writedown losses before and after the issuance of SFAS No. 121. 
In this chapter, results of testing each of the three proposed hypotheses are presented. 
Next, a discussion of the descriptive statistics of the data and some of the sample 
characteristics is presented. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics and Sample Characteristics 
Table 3 summarizes the final sample of 436 observations. The observations are 
derived initially from the Lexis/Nexis database. An initial sample of 1,352 firm/year 
observations is derived from a keyword search of 1993-97 SEC 10K’s included in the 
Lexis/Nexis database under “SEC Annual Reports to Shareholders” library.  
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This sample of 1,352 observations is reduced by 473 firm/year observations 
because some of the observed firms are filed in the “SEC Annual Reports to 
Shareholders” library under two different years due to different fiscal year-ends. The 
sample is again reduced by 102 observations related to the year 1992. The sample is 
further reduced by 71 firm/year observations and 74 firm/year observations that are not 
found in the CRSP database and the Compustat PC Plus database, respectively. Of the 
remaining observations, the sample is reduced by 196 firm/year observations for firms 
that reported asset writedown losses of less than 1% of their total assets since these 
reported losses are assumed to be immaterial and not significantly different from zero 
(Elliott and Shaw 1988 and Francis et al. 1996). As noted in Table 3, the final sample 
consisted of unbalanced data of 436 firm/year observations consisting of 132 different 
firms. This number of observations is similar to that in many other asset impairment 
studies. For instance, Fried et al. (1989) use a sample of 623 events from a six-year 
period, while Elliott and Shaw (1988) use a sample of 240 events spanning a four year 
period.    
Tables 4 and 5 present the sample distribution based on year, “big bath” and 
“income smoothing” classification, as discussed in detail in the Asset Writedown 
Hypothesis (H2) section 4.2.4, and SFAS No. 121 adoption. Eighty-four firm/year 
observations (19%) are firms that adopted the “big bath” technique and applied SFAS 
No. 121, while 102 firm/year observations (23%) are firms that adopted the “big bath” 
technique without applying SFAS No. 121. Similarly, firms that adopted the “income 
smoothing” technique and applied SFAS No. 121 are 118 firm/year observations (27%), 
while 132 firm/year observations (30%) did not adopt SFAS No. 121. Therefore, 43% of 
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the sample are characterized as “big bath” observations, while 57% are characterized as 
“income smoothing” observations, and 46% of the sample are post-SFAS No. 121, while 
54% of the sample is pre-SFAS No. 121 guidance. The average asset writedown loss 
magnitude for the sample is $5.52 million, while the average asset writedown magnitude 
as a percentage of total assets is 1.56%. For the sake of comparison with previous studies, 
Table 6 presents the distribution of firms that reported asset writedown losses over the 
sample period. It shows that 65% of those firms are “big bath” firms, while only 35% are 
“income smoothing” firms. These characteristics are similar to that of Zucca and 
Campbell (1992), who reported that 67% of their 67 firms in their sample adopted the 
“big bath” technique, while 33% adopted the “income smoothing” technique. Moreover, 
Zucca and Campbell (1992) reported that the average amount of writedown losses is 
$32.43 million, while the average asset writedowns as a percentage of total assets is 
4.05%. Similarly, in this study, the sample of firms who reported asset writedown losses 
has an average amount of $34.89 million, which is 9.88% of the total assets.       
5.3 Results of Testing the Three Different Hypotheses 
Three models are used to analyze the effects of SFAS No. 121 on asset 
impairment reporting: the Random-Effects Tobit model, the Binary Dependent Variable 
Panel Data model, and the traditional Random-Effects Panel Data model. Each model 
was designed to test one of the three aspects of the research question: asset writedown 
magnitude, the timing of reporting the asset writedown loss, and the short-term market 





5.3.1 Results of Testing Hypothesis 1 (Asset Writedown Magnitude) 
The first hypothesis states that SFAS No.121 reduces the magnitude of asset 
writedowns relative to the magnitude of asset writedowns reported before SFAS No.121. 
The Random-Effects Tobit model used to test this hypothesis is repeated below for 
convenience: 
WDMit = α0 + α1 AEit +α2 FAS121it + ui +εit  (4-5)
Where: 
 WDMit = Asset writedown magnitude (dollar amount) for firm “i” in year “t”. 
 itAE  = Reported accounting earnings excluding the asset writedown loss 
for firm “i” in year “t”. 
 FAS121it = 1 if the observation for firm “i” collected in year “t” is subject to 
the rules of SFAS No.121, and 0 if not. 
 ui = A firm-specific random variable that encompasses unobservable, 
time-invariant factors that differentiate firms.  
 εit = The error term of the regression model. 
  WDMit and AEit are deflated by the total assets of the same year (t). 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses of interest are: 
H0: α2 ≥ 0 
H1: α2 < 0 
If the null hypothesis is rejected in favor of the alternative, it would indicate that the 
magnitude of asset writedowns is lower post-SFAS No. 121. 
Exhibit 1 provides the results of the Tobit model for the sample of 436 
observations. It is important before drawing any inference from the results to examine the 
significance and “goodness of fit” of the overall model.  
The likelihood ratio statistic tests the null hypothesis that all the parameters of the 
model, except the intercept, are jointly equal to zero. It is calculated as 2 times 
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(unrestricted likelihood function – restricted likelihood function). The calculated 
likelihood function for this model is 12.441. Using the chi-square statistic, the critical 
value is 6.63, with one degree of freedom and a  .01 significance level. Therefore, it is 
appropriate to reject the null hypothesis at a .01 significance level that all of the 
parameters of the model, except the intercept, are jointly equal to zero.  
To test the “goodness of fit” of the overall model, it is appropriate to calculate the 
likelihood ratio index, which is calculated as 1 minus (the unrestricted log likelihood 
function divided by the restricted likelihood function). The calculated likelihood ratio 
index for this model is 13%. This percentage is acceptable as a sign of “goodness of fit” 
for the overall model, especially for a random-effects model. Since the calculated 
likelihood ratio statistic indicates that the full model fits the data significantly better than 
the model with the intercept only, it is appropriate to consider the inference that the 
results provide.  
Results of estimating the equation (4-5) are presented in Exhibit 1. The primary 
question of interest is whether or not the issuance of SFAS No. 121 reduces the 
magnitude of asset writedown losses relative to that before the application of SFAS No. 
121.  A statistically significant and negative value for α2 in this equation would suggest 
that SFAS No. 121 decreased the reported asset writedown magnitude. However, the 
results indicate that SFAS No. 121 did not have a significant effect on the reported asset 
writedown magnitude. In addition, the reported accounting earnings excluding writedown 
loss (AE) is significant. This suggests that the asset writedown magnitude is influenced, 
among other things, by the pre-writedown reported accounting numbers. This result is not 
surprising, since the FASB’s approach in SFAS No.121 gives management substantial 
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flexibility to exercise judgment in determining and reporting the magnitude of 
impairment losses.  
5.3.2 Results of Testing Hypothesis 2 (Timing of Reporting Asset Writedown Loss) 
The second hypothesis states that SFAS No. 121 restricts the timing of reporting 
asset writedowns such that the number of firms with negative (positive) unexpected 
earnings reporting asset writedowns will be fewer post-SFAS No. 121 relative to the 
number of firms with negative (positive) unexpected earnings reporting asset writedowns 
pre-SFAS No. 121.  
As discussed in chapter four, “income smoothing” and “big bath” may be viewed 
as two techniques characterizing the timing of asset writedowns. The “big bath” 
technique is applied in periods in which pre-writedown earnings are below expected 
earnings.  Firms are assumed to report asset writedowns whenever there are negative 
unexpected earnings. Similarly, the “income smoothing” technique is expected in periods 
in which pre-writedown earnings are above expected earnings. Thus, firms are assumed 
to report asset writedowns whenever there are positive unexpected earnings in order to 
smooth earnings. Hence, if SFAS No.121 restricts management’s discretion in the timing 
of reporting asset writedowns, firms with negative (positive) unexpected earnings that 
reported asset writedowns post-SFAS No.121 will be fewer than firms with unexpected 
negative (positive) earnings pre-SFAS No.121 reporting asset writedowns. As specified 
in chapter four, the Binary Dependent Panel Data model is used to test hypothesis 2 and 
is repeated below for convenience: 






 itWD         = 1 if firm “i” reports asset writedowns in year "t", and 0 
otherwise. 
 FAS121it   = 1 if the observation collected in year “t” for firm “i” is subject 
to the rules of SFAS No.121, and 0 otherwise. 
 itBB  = 1 if firm “i” has negative unexpected earnings (a “big bath” 
firm) in year “t”, and 0 if firm “i” has positive unexpected 
earnings (an “income smoothing” firm) in year “t”. 
 itAE  = Reported accounting earnings excluding the writedown loss for 
firm “i” in year “t”. 
 ui               = A firm-specific random variable that encompasses unobservable, 
time-invariant factors that differentiate firms.  
 εit = The error term of the regression model. 
           AEit are deflated by the total assets of the same year (t). 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses for “big bath” firms are: 
H0: (β0+ β1+ β2) ≥ (β0+ β2) 
H1: (β0+ β1+ β2) < (β0+ β2) 
The null and alternative hypothesis for “income smoothing” firms are: 
H0: (β0+ β1) ≥ (β0) 
H1: (β0+ β1) < (β0) 
The results of estimating equation (4-8) are reported in Exhibit 2. In order to draw 
inferences from the estimated results, it is important to examine the significance and 
“goodness of fit” of the overall model before.  
As previously discussed, the likelihood ratio statistic tests the null hypothesis that 
all the parameters of the model, except the intercept, are jointly equal to zero. It is 
calculated as 2 times (unrestricted likelihood function – restricted likelihood function). 
The calculated likelihood function for this model is 7.635. With one degree of freedom 
and a .01 significance level, the chi-square critical value is 6.63. Therefore, it is 
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appropriate to reject the null hypothesis (at the .01 significance level) that all of the 
parameters of the model, except the intercept, are jointly equal to zero.  
To test the “goodness of fit” of the overall Probit model, it is appropriate to 
examine both the likelihood ratio index and the frequency of correct predictions of the 
predicted outcomes. The calculated likelihood ratio index for this model is 3%. In 
addition, the frequency of correct predictions examines the frequency that the predicted 
and actual outcomes are the same. For this model, the frequency that the predicted and 
actual outcomes are the same for the dependent variable (WD) equal to zero is 97%. The 
frequency that the predicted and actual outcomes are the same for the dependent variable 
(WD) equal to one is 26% (Exhibit 2). That is, the model predicts 373 of 436, or 86%, of 
the observations correctly. Overall, the estimated Probit model is highly significant, with 
a reasonable “goodness of fit.” This suggests that it is appropriate to consider the 
inference that the estimated results provide.   
In Exhibit 2, the results suggest that (FAS121) is not significant at affecting asset 
writedown decisions, while the reported accounting earnings excluding writedown loss 
(AE) is significant. However, the model indicates that firms have different behavior 
toward deciding whether or not to report asset writedown loss in a particular year. That 
is, the (BB) variable, which divides the sample into two groups; “income smoothing” 
(positive unexpected earnings) and “big bath” (negative unexpected earnings), is 
significant. Therefore, “big bath” firms take asset writedown actions more frequently 
relative to “income smoothing” firms regardless of SFAS No. 121. Thus, it appears that 




5.3.3 Additional Analysis 
As discussed previously, the primary question of interest is whether or not SFAS 
No. 121 affects the magnitude of asset writedowns. The results indicate that SFAS No. 
121 does not have a significant effect on the magnitude of reported asset writedowns. 
However, SFAS No. 121 might be affecting the asset impairment reporting of some types 
of firms, but not all firms. Therefore, the study investigates the effect of SFAS No. 121 
on the magnitude of asset writedown losses reported by “big bath” firms and “income 
smoothing” firms.      
The following Tobit model is used in testing the magnitude hypothesis for both 
“big bath” firms and “income smoothing” firms: 
WDMit = δ0 + δ 1AEit + δ 2 BBPOSTit + δ 3 BBPREit + δ 4 ISPOSTit + 




 WDMit         = Asset writedown magnitude (dollar amount) for firm “i” in 
year “t”. 
 AEit = Reported accounting earnings excluding the writedown loss 
for firm “i” in year “t”. 
 BBPOSTit    = 1 if firm “i” has negative unexpected earnings, negative net 
income, and adopted SFAS No.121 in year “t”, and 0 
otherwise. 
 BBPREit = 1 if firm “i” has negative unexpected earnings, negative net 
income, and does not adopt SFAS No.121 in year “t”, and 0 
otherwise. 
 ISPOSTit = 1 if firm “i” has positive unexpected earnings, positive net 
income, and adopted SFAS No.121 in year “t”, and 0 
otherwise. 
 ISPREit = 1 if firm “i” has positive unexpected earnings, positive net 
income, and does not adopt SFAS No.121 in year “t”, and 0 
otherwise. 
 OTHRPSTit  = 1 if firm “i” in year “t” is neither a “big bath” nor an “income 
smoothing” firm that adopted SFAS No. 121, and 0 if not. 
 ui               = A firm-specific random variable that encompasses 
unobservable, time-invariant factors that differentiate firms.  




The null and alternative hypotheses for “big bath” firms are: 
H0: δ2  ≥ δ3  
H1: δ2 < δ3 
However, the null and alternative hypotheses for “income smoothing” firms are: 
H0 δ4  ≥ δ5 
H1: δ4 < δ5 
Exhibit 3 provides the results of the Tobit model for the sample of 436 firm/year 
observations. As noted previously, the likelihood ratio statistic tests the null hypothesis 
that all the parameters of the model, except the intercept, are jointly equal to zero. The 
calculated likelihood function for this model is 11.763. Using the chi-square statistic, the 
critical value is 6.63, with one degree of freedom and a .01 significance level. Therefore, 
it is appropriate to reject the null hypothesis at a .01 level of significance. Moreover, to 
test the “goodness of fit” of the overall model, the likelihood ratio index is calculated. 
The calculated likelihood ratio index for this model is 21%, which is better than the 
original model (13%). Both the calculated likelihood ratio statistic and the calculated 
likelihood ratio index indicate that it is appropriate to consider the inference that the 
estimated results provide.  
Results of estimating equation (5-1) are presented in Exhibit 3. The primary 
question of interest is whether or not the magnitude of asset writedowns for either “big 
bath” or “income smoothing” firms is affected by SFAS No. 121. 
Similar to model (4-5), the reported accounting earnings excluding writedown 
loss (AE) is significant. In addition, for “big bath” firms, the null hypothesis that the 
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magnitude of asset writedowns after post-SFAS No. 121 is not different from that pre-
SFAS No. 121 cannot be rejected (BBPOST=BBPRE). Similarly, for “income 
smoothing” firms, the null hypothesis that the asset writedown loss magnitude after the 
adoption of SFAS No. 121 is not different from that before SFAS No. 121 cannot be 
rejected (ISPOST=ISPRE). However, testing the null hypothesis that, after the adoption 
of SFAS No. 121, the asset writedown loss magnitude for “big bath” firms is not different 
from the asset writedown loss magnitude for “income smoothing” firms suggests that, on 
the average,  “big bath” firms report  .12m more asset writedown losses than “income 
smoothing” firms. Similarly, testing the null hypothesis that, before the adoption of SFAS 
No. 121, the asset writedown loss magnitude of  “big bath” firms is not different from 
that of  “income smoothing” firms suggests that, on the average, the “big bath” firms 
report  .17m more asset writedowns than the “income smoothing” firms. These findings 
support the belief that the practice of reporting asset writedown losses is not affected by 
the FASB’s new accounting standard. However, the results support the notion that firms 
have different behavior toward deciding the magnitude of asset writedowns. 
5.3.4 Results of Testing Hypothesis 3 (Information Content) 
Hypothesis 3 states that during the three-day event window surrounding the 
announcement of asset writedowns, the CAR of “big bath” (“income smoothing”) firms 
reporting asset writedowns post-SFAS No.121 is smaller (larger) than the CAR of “big 
bath” (“income smoothing”) firms reporting asset writedowns pre-SFAS No.121. This 
hypothesis test seeks to investigate whether or not short-term market reactions (if any) 
resulting from the announcement of asset writedown losses differ significantly before and 
after the application of SFAS No. 121. It is hypothesized that SFAS No.121 will have 
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different effects on firms, depending on which technique those firms adopted, that is, “big 
bath” or “income smoothing.” As an initial investigation, the following Random-Effects 
model is used to test whether the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is affected for “big 











CARit = The cumulative abnormal stock returns for firm “i” in year 
“t” for the three-day period (-1, 1) surrounding the 10K or 
AR release date.  
UEit = The unexpected earnings excluding the asset writedown 
loss using a random walk model for firm “i” in year “t”.  
WDMit    = The magnitude of assets writedown of firm “i” in year “t”. 
FAS121it = 1 if the observation collected for firm “i” in year “t” is 
subject to the rules of SFAS No.121, and 0 if not. 
BBit = 1 if firm “i” has negative unexpected earnings (a “big bath” 
firm) in year “t”, and 0 if firm “i” has positive unexpected 
earnings (an “income smoothing” firm) in year “t”. 
ui   = A firm-specific random variable that encompasses 
unobservable, time-invariant factors that differentiate firms.  
εit = The error term of the regression model. 
 
 The null and alternative hypotheses for the “big bath” firms are respectively: 
H0: (γ2 + γ5 + γ7) = 0 
H1: (γ2 + γ5 + γ7) ≠ 0 
The results suggest, as presented in Exhibit 4, that the linear combination of the 
coefficients of the writedown variables (WDM, WDMFAS, and WDMBB) for “big bath” 
firms is significantly different from zero at a .01 level of significance. That is, the null 
hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal return for “big bath” firms reporting asset 
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writedowns after the adoption of SFAS No.121 is not different from zero is rejected. This 
finding suggests that, in the short-term, the market is affected by the announcement of 
asset writedown losses post-SFAS No. 121 by “big bath” firms. It perceives this 
announcement as good news. Testing the same hypothesis over wider event windows 
such as (-2, 2) and (-3, 3) produces similar results, with a higher significance in rejecting 
the null hypothesis for the “big bath” firms (Exhibits 5 and 6).     
However, the null and alternative hypotheses for the “income smoothing” firms 
are: 
H0: (γ2 + γ5) = 0 
H1: (γ2 + γ5) ≠ 0 
The results suggest that the linear combination of the coefficients of the 
writedown variables (WDM and WDMFAS) for “income smoothing” firms is not 
significant at a 0.01 significance level (or even a 0.1 significance level). In addition, the 
unexpected earnings excluding the asset writedown loss variable (UE) are highly 
significant at a .01 significance level. This finding suggests that the market does not react 
to the asset writedown losses announced by the “income smoothing” firms after the 
adoption of SFAS No. 121. The same results are found when analyzing wider event 
windows. Testing the same hypothesis over wider event windows such as (-2, 2) and (-3, 
3) produces similar results in failing to reject the null hypothesis for the “income 
smoothing” firms (Exhibits 5 and 6).     
However, the primary question of interest is whether or not the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) before the issuance of SFAS No. 121 differ from the CAR after 
the issuance of SFAS No. 121 when there are announcements of asset writedowns. The 
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following previously specified Random-Effects model is used to test the proposed 












CARit = The cumulative abnormal stock returns for firm “i” in year 
“t” for the three-day period (-1, 1) around the 10K or AR 
release date, where 0 is the 10K or Annual Report (AR) 
release date whichever comes earlier. 
UEit    = The unexpected earnings excluding the asset writedown 
loss using a random walk model for firm “i” in year “t”.  
WDBBPSTit    = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
negative unexpected earnings and negative net income (big 
bath) in year “t” that adopted SFAS No. 121. 
WDBBPREit = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
negative unexpected earnings and negative net income (big 
bath) in year “t” before the adoption of SFAS No. 121. 
WDISPSTit = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
positive unexpected earnings and positive net income 
“income smoothing” in year “t” that adopted SFAS No. 
121. 
WDISPREi   = The assets writedown magnitude of a firm “i” that has 
positive unexpected earnings and positive net income 
“income smoothing” in year “t” before the adoption of 
SFAS No. 121. 
WDOTHRPSit    = The assets writedown magnitude of firm “i” in year “t” that 
is neither a “big bath” or “income smoothing” firm that 
adopted SFAS No. 121. 
WDBBPREit = The assets writedown magnitude of firm “i” in year “t” that 
is neither a “big bath” or “income smoothing” firm before 
adopting SFAS No. 121. 
εit = The error term of the regression model. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses for the “big bath” firms are:  
H0: (γ2 - γ3) ≥ 0 
H1: (γ2 – γ3) < 0 
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As presented in Exhibit 7, the results suggest that the CAR for “big bath” firms 
after SFAS No. 121 is not significantly different from that for “big bath” firms before the 
issuance of SFAS No. 121 at a .01 significance level. However, testing the same 
hypothesis over a wider event window revealed that there is a significant difference 
between the CAR for “big bath” firms before and after the adoption of SFAS No. 121. 
That is, over a five-day event window and a seven-day event window, the cumulative 
abnormal returns for “big bath” firms that announce asset writedown losses before and 
after the adoption of SFAS No. 121 are significantly different from each other (Exhibit 8 
and 9). This suggests that the cumulative abnormal returns of  “big bath” firms resulting 
from the announcement of asset writedown losses after SFAS No. 121 are higher than 
those of  “big bath” firms before SFAS No. 121.      
However, the null and alternative hypotheses for the “income smoothing” firms 
are: 
H0: (γ4 + γ5) ≤ 0 
H1: (γ4 + γ5) > 0 
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) for “income smoothing” firms after 
SFAS No. 121 are not significantly different from those for “income smoothing” firms 
before the issuance of SFAS No. 121 at a .01 significance level (or .1 significance level). 
In addition, this finding holds for wider event windows such as a five-day event window 
and a seven-day event window (Exhibit 8 and 9).   
To summarize, the results from the two models suggest that the market evaluates 
the asset writedown losses after the issuance of SFAS No. 121 as good news for “big 
bath” firms, similar to the findings of Strong and Meyer (1987) and Frantz (1999). 
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However, while the announcement of asset writedown losses affect the CAR after SFAS 
No. 121 higher than the announcement of asset writedown losses before SFAS No. 121, 
the SFAS No. 121 does not have any significant effects on the asset writedown 
magnitude or the timing of when to report such impairment. In addition, for “income 
smoothing” firms, the results suggest that the market does not respond to the 
announcement of asset writedowns either before or after the issuance of SFAS No. 121. 
The difference in the reaction observed in the CAR for “big bath” and “income 
smoothing” firms when asset writedown losses were announced is not surprising. As the 
study indicated previously, there are three possible market reactions toward the 
announcement of asset writedowns: the no-effects hypothesis, the bad news hypothesis, 
and the good news hypothesis. The results of this study suggest that asset writedown 
losses reported by “income smoothing” firms are viewed by the market as manipulative 
actions that do not have real economic consequences. However, the results also suggest 
that asset writedown losses reported by “big bath” firms are viewed by the market as a 
sign of real changes occurring within these firms, which are expected to lead to better 
economic performance in the near future.   
In addition, it is not surprising that, while the results suggest that SFAS No. 121 
does not have an effect on the magnitude of the asset impairment losses, the CAR for 
“big bath” firms that announced asset writedown losses is higher after the adoption of 
SFAS No. 121 than the CAR for “big bath” firms that announced asset writedown losses 
before SFAS No. 121. The higher CAR observed after the adoption of SFAS No. 121 for 
“big bath” firms may suggest that the market perceives the announcement of asset 
impairment losses after the adoption of SFAS No. 121 as more credible since these 
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announcements are under the explicit authoritative guidance of the new standard. Both 
before and after the adoption of SFAS No. 121, the market perceives the asset writedown 
loss announcements for “big bath” firms as one type of news that shows the 
managements’ attempts at developing and restructuring their firms in order to accomplish 
better performance. However, the market views the asset impairment announcements 
after the application of SFAS No. 121 with greater confidence in the reported numbers, 
since the practice of reporting asset writedowns after the issuance of SFAS No. 121 is 
under the FASB’s authoritative guidance, which brings some consistency and 






RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The objective of this study was to investigate whether SFAS No.121 restricts 
management’s discretion in reporting asset impairment and whether SFAS No.121 has 
resulted in an increase in reporting asset impairments and reduced earnings manipulation. 
This study investigated whether SFAS No.121 decreased management’s discretion in 
asset writedown magnitude and timing. It examined the information content of asset 
impairment loss announcements after the issuance of SFAS No.121, as measured by the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). That is, it investigated the short-term market 
reactions to the announcement of asset writedown losses both before and after the 
issuance of SFAS No. 121. 
The findings provide support for the hypothesis that the SFAS No. 121 does not 
affect the magnitude of asset writedown losses. Further, the results suggest that the asset 
writedown magnitude is influenced, among other things, by the pre-writedown reported 
accounting numbers. The findings also support the hypothesis that SFAS No. 121 does 
not affect the timing of when to report asset writedowns. However, the findings suggest 
that firms have different behaviors toward deciding the asset writedown magnitude and 
whether or not to report asset writedown losses in a particular year. That is, “big bath” 
firms take more asset writedown actions of a higher magnitude relative to that of “income 
smoothing” firms, regardless of SFAS No. 121. The FASB’s approach in SFAS No.121 
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gives management substantial flexibility to exercise judgment in determining and 
reporting the magnitude of impairment losses, which weakens the achievement of the 
intended objectives from the issuance of SFAS No. 121.  
In addition, the findings of this study suggest that the market evaluates the asset 
writedown losses after the issuance of SFAS No. 121 as good news for “big bath” firms, 
while for “income smoothing” firms, the market does not respond to the announcement of 
asset writedown losses, either before or after the issuance of SFAS No. 121. The findings 
of this study suggest that asset writedown losses reported by “big bath” firms are viewed 
by the market as a sign of real changes occurring within these firms that are expected to 
lead to better performance in the near future. However, the results suggest that asset 
writedown losses reported by “income smoothing” firms are viewed by the market as 
either manipulative or immaterial actions that do not have real economic consequences. 
The findings also suggest that, for “big bath” firms, the market perceives the 
announcement of asset impairment losses after the adoption of SFAS No. 121 as more 
credible relative to that before the issuance of SFAS No. 121. This is due to the fact that 
the practice of reporting asset writedowns after the issuance of SFAS No. 121 is under 
the FASB’s authoritative guidance, which brings some consistency and comparability in 
asset impairment reporting. As a result, the application of SFAS No. 121 provides users 
with better insight into management policies and actions. 
The findings of this study also provide evidence as to whether SFAS No.121 
constrains management’s discretion in recognizing asset impairment losses. It supports 
the suspicion raised by many scholars about the attainment of the FASB’s objective of 
bringing consistency in financial reporting practice through SFAS No. 121. Specifically, 
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it provides the FASB with an answer to a central question as to whether there is too much 
discretion allowed for management under SFAS No.121 in reporting asset writedowns. 
By leaving the underlying assumptions of evaluating and measuring asset impairment to 
be decided by management, there is a great risk that firms may take advantage of this as 
an opportunity to smooth income or to take a “big bath.” However, the new proposed 
statement issued by the FASB on June 30, 2000, would limit some of the substantial 
flexibility that is allowed by management to determine and report asset impairment 
losses. The FASB’s proposal would require the use of the present value of future cash 
flows instead of the market value as the best indicator of an asset’s value. Discounted 
cash flows allow for less management manipulation because they require an asset to be 
valued at its true service potential. Additionally, the proposed statement would not allow 
management to use a market value that is not indicative of the asset’s worth to the firm 
(i.e., a unique asset with a low market value, but high future cash flows). Therefore, the 
new statement would reduce or even prevent management from taking one large 
reduction against income in the current period in order to provide better net income in 
future periods.  
This study provides evidence that asset writedown literature after SFAS No. 121 
is still within the literature of discretionary asset writedowns. Future studies about asset 
impairment should be analyzed as discretionary events that are under management’s 
influence, since they have some flexibility in deciding how much of a writedown to take 
and when to record it. This discretion in asset impairment reporting after the issuance of 
SFAS No. 121 allows for studies that investigate the motivation and incentives behind 
reporting such actions.    
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There are potential new opportunities for research in the area of asset writedown 
losses.  One might investigate the association between reporting asset impairment losses 
and change in management and compare that association before and after the issuance of 
SFAS No. 121. New management might report more asset impairment either to “clean” 
the company records in an attempt to provide better earnings in future periods or to report 
substantial changes that would result in better economic performance. “Big bath” firms 
that have negative net income and have unexpected negative earnings might report fewer 
asset impairment losses when there is a management change after the issuance of SFAS 
No. 121 relative to that before it.  
Future research that extends this study might include an investigation of the effect 
of the new proposed standard that will supersede SFAS No. 121 on asset writedown 
reporting. That is, one might investigate the effect of the new standard on the magnitude 
and timing of long-lived asset writedown reporting and also conduct a comparison 
between the effects of SFAS No. 121 and the effects of the new standard on asset 
impairment reporting.  
There are many sets of potential users that may be interested in the information 
implicit in asset writedowns and/or users that are potentially affected by a firm’s 
recording or not recording such asset writedowns. Some of these user groups include 
lenders; financial analysts; institutional investors; and firms that are involved in a 
potential merger, acquisition, or other forms of alliance. Future research could investigate 
the implications of firms’ asset writedown behavior for these other constituencies and 
analyze the effect of SFAS No. 121 on these implications and constituencies. Thus, one 
avenue for developing new research in this area would be to examine the usefulness of 
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the accounting information related to asset writedowns for a broader spectrum of decision 
makers both before and after SFAS No. 121.   
One limitation of the present research is the use of the entire reported writedown 
loss in analyzing the market reaction towards the announcement of asset writedown 
losses. A major concern in information content studies of writedowns is the difficulty of 
determining the market’s expectation of the writedown amount at the time that it is 
announced. This study, similar to all asset writedown studies, uses the entire amount of 
the writedown rather than estimating the unexpected portion since the unexpected portion 
is unobservable. If some of the writedown is expected, using the entire writedown 
amount introduces measurement error, which causes biased and inconsistent estimates of 
the models’ coefficients. Several studies, as reviewed in chapter three, provided evidence 
that the market anticipates writedowns, suggesting that the expected part of the 
writedown may not be equal to zero, as prior studies typically have assumed. This 
suggests that using the total writedown amount could limit the conclusions that are drawn 
from this study related to the information content of reported asset impairment.  
In addition, there are data limitations that limit the generalizability of this 
research. Since the study relies on disclosures under SFAS No. 121, only a few years of 
observations are available for each firm; furthermore, firms are included only if they are 
included in the Lexis/Nexis, Compustat PC, and CRSP databases. 
Finally, this study investigated the effects of SFAS No. 121 on asset impairment 
reporting and compared the information content (surprise element) of the loss 
announcement as measured by cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) before and after the 
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issuance of SFAS No. 121. Results will provide accounting standard-setters with insights 



















Compustat Firms With Negative Special Items in Excess of 1% Assets 
During 1982-1992. 
 
Years From 1982 Through 1985a Years From 1988 Through 1992b  





59 57 72 117 359 422 535 567 614 
Years 
1982-1985 a 1988-1992 b 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Writeoffs 143.6 49.7 76.2 8.8 
% of Assets 8.2 5.0 6.7 3.6 
a adapted from Elliott and Shaw 1988. 
























1980 41 $1,075 $650 $28.3 $21.0 
1981 57 1,746 971 32.9 22.6 
1982 103 5,487 3,548 57.2 47.3 
1983 114 6,809 4,693 62.5 55.9 
1984 128 7,694 4,222 63.1 44.0 
1985 180 21,536 12,261 124.5 99.7 
Overall 623 $44,347 $26,345 $75.0 $58.3 
1Based on 324 companies representing 623 company-years of writedown announcements. 





















Firms from Lexis/Nexis 
database 
 
358 269 234 246 245 1,352 
Less:       
Firms that are reported 
in two different years. 
 
(140) (138) (62) (51) (82) (473) 
Firms that are related to 
year 1992. 
 
(102) (0) (0) (0) (0) (102) 
Firms that are not found 
in CRSP database. 
  
(15) (16) (15) (13) (12) (71) 
Firms that have missing 
data in the Compustat 
PC Plus database. 
  
(18) (19) (17) (15) (5) (74) 
Firms that reported asset 
writedown loss less than 
1% of total assets. 
 
(31) (33) (42) (46) (44) (196) 
52 63 98 121 102 436 Total observations 





The Study’s Sample by Year, Earning Management Technique 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total 













Number of firms 
characterized as “big bath” 












Number of firms 
characterized as “income 


















The Study’s Sample by Earning Management Technique, and SFAS No. 121 Adoption 
 
 
 Pre-SFAS121 Post-SFAS121 Total  % of Total  
Big bath firms 102 (24%) 84 (19%) 186 43% 
Income smoothing firms 132 (30%) 118 (27%) 250 57% 
Total  234 202 436 100% 
% of Total 54% 46% 100%  
     
The average asset 
writedown magnitude for 
the sample (in millions).  
$5.52    
     
The average asset 
writedown magnitude as a 
% of total assets.  






Writedown Firms by Earning Management Technique and SFAS No. 121 Adoption 
 
 Pre-FAS121 Post-FAS121 Total  % of Total 
Big Bath firms  25 (36%) 20 (29%) 45 65% 
Income Smoothing Firms 9 (13%) 15 (22%) 24 35% 
Total  34 35 69 100% 
% of Total 49% 51% 100%  
     
The average asset writedown 
magnitude for all firms who 
reported asset impairment in 
the sample (in millions).  
$34.89    
     
The average asset writedown 
magnitude as a % of total 
assets for all firms who 
reported asset impairment in 
the sample.  














WDMit = α0 + α1 AEit +α2 FAS121it + ui +εit  (4-5)
 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
CONSTANT -.15586 .0181311 -8.594 .0000 N/A
AE -.49780 .0419019 -11.880 .0000 .01119251
FAS121 .01938 .0199366 .972 .3310 .46330275
 
Number of observations                                          436 
Iterations completed                                                9 
Unrestricted log likelihood function                      -41.49217 
Restricted log likelihood function                          -47.71283      
Chi-squared                                                              12.44131 
Degrees of freedom                                                  1 






The Results of the Binary Dependent Panel Data Model Used to Test Hypothesis 2 
 
itiit3it2it10it εuAEβBBβFAS121ββWD +++++=  (4-8)
 
 
Variable Coefficient  Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
CONSTANT -1.704737599 .23862437 -7.144 .0000 
FAS121 .159769028 .20866132 .766 .4439 .46330275
BB .391652863 .18243465 2.147 .0318 .42660550
AE -4.652798048 .78416176 -5.933 .0000 .01119251
 
 
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes: 
 Predicted Total 
Actual 0 1  
0 355 12 367 
1 51 18 69 
Total 406 30 436 
 
 
Number of observations  436      
Iterations completed  12      
Log likelihood function  -146.4365      
Restricted log likelihood  -150.2543      
Chi-squared                      7.635619      
Degrees of freedom  1      





The Results of the New Tobit Model Used in Testing the Magnitude Hypothesis for Both  
“Big Bath” Firms and “Income Smoothing” Firms 
 
WDMit = δ0 + δ 1AEit + δ 2 BBPOSTit + δ 3 BBPREit + δ 4 ISPOSTit + 
δ 5 ISPREit + δ 6 OTHRPSTit +ui +εit  
(5-1) 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
CONSTANT -.13902471 .020684000 -6.721 .0000 N/A
AE -.37493745 .048300585 -7.763 .0000 .01119251
BBPOST .04321620 .034131879 1.266 .2055 .07568807
BBPRE .06751088 .030254844 2.231 .0257 .09403670
ISPOST -.07876846 .042185778 -1.867 .0619 .21788991
ISPRE -.10683016 .047279832 -2.260 .0239 .25688073
OTHERPOS .04888771 .027044981 1.808 .0707 .16972477
 
Number of observations   436      
Iterations completed   13      
Log likelihood function   -24.18535      
Restricted log likelihood   -30.06664      
Chi-squared    11.76257      
Degrees of freedom   1      
Significance level   .6043370E-03  
 
Testing BBPOST=BBPRE                         
 
Chi-squared =     .58             Sig. level =  .44528  
 
Testing ISPOST=ISPRE                         
 




 EXHIBIT 4 
The Results of the Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model Used in the Initial 
Testing of Hypothesis 3 














Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
UE 14.959566 5.650227 2.648 .0081 -.01512296
WDM -3.932525 19.476405 -.202 .8400 .01563876
FAS121 -.5921919 .834033 -.710 .4777 .46330275
BB .3997163 .949036 .421 .6736 .42660550
WDMFAS 23.3835312 14.628928 1.598 .1099 .00784387
BBFAS -.0336231 1.325459 -.025 .9798 .19266055
WDMBB 29.7101506 16.732326 1.776 .0758 .01157085
CONSTANT -.3868075 .673624 -.574 .5658 N/A
 
Testing for “Big Bath” Firms:                     
 
Chi-squared =   11.37  Sig. level =  .00075       
 
Testing For “Income Smoothing” Firms:             
 





The Results of the Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model Used in the Initial 
Testing of Hypothesis 3 













Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
UE 14.55109248 6.035579 2.411 .0159 -.01512295
WDM -1.97949205 20.773375 -.095 .9241 .01563875
FAS121 .37767808 .889442 .425 .6711 .46330275
BB .70492144 1.012211 .696 .4862 .42660550
WDMFAS 22.59735618 15.607987 1.448 .1477 .00784387
BBFAS -.23216909 1.413064 -.164 .8695 .19266055
WDMBB 35.24134770 17.838252 1.976 .0482 .01157085
CONSTANT -.91811668 .7135696 -1.287 .1982 N/A
 
Testing “big bath” Firms:                         
             
Chi-squared =   12.90   Sig. level =  .00033       
 
Testing “income smoothing” firms:                 
              







The Results of the Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model Used in the Initial 
Testing of Hypothesis 3 















Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
UE 18.15607361 7.1552934 2.537 .0112 -.01512296
WDM -.99680849 24.654171 -.040 .9677 .01563876
FAS121 .54243255 1.055714 .514 .6074 .46330275
BB 1.26311669 1.201327 1.051 .2931 .42660550
WDMFAS 26.47158547 18.519590 1.429 .1529 .00784386
BBFAS .38018409 1.677611 .227 .8207 .19266055
WDMBB 37.05535228 21.177893 1.750 .0802 .01157085
CONSTANT -.99723446 .851067 -1.172 .2413 N/A
Testing “big bath” firms:                                    
 
Chi-squared =   11.48   Sig. level =  .00070       
 
Testing “income smoothing” firms:                          
 









The Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model Used to Test Hypothesis 3 

















Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
UE 13.129311 5.06704 2.591 .0096 -.01512296
WDBBPST 44.999352 15.10539 2.979 .0029 .00403817
WDBBPRE 25.265699 11.91804 2.120 .0340 .00659231
WDISPST 61.912482 99.99204 .619 .5358 .00021050
WDISPRE -138.097226 217.06224 -.636 .5246 .00009483
WDOTHRPS 18.574598 13.16456 1.411 .1583 .00359524
WDOTHRPR -.933024 42.38083 -.022 .9824 .00110775
Constant -.479885 .44457 -1.079 .2804 N/A
               
Testing “big bath” firms:                         
 
Chi-squared =    1.75   Sig. level =  .18542       
 
Testing “income smoothing” firms:                         
 





The Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model Used to Test Hypothesis 3 















Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
UE 11.7750557 5.39557 2.182 .0291 -.015122955
WDBBPST 62.1740001 16.04680 3.875 .0001 .004038172
WDBBPRE 29.6221035 12.67010 2.338 .0194 .006592313
WDISPST 73.0599966 106.20545 .688 .4915 .000210458
WDISPRE 38.0337913 229.46263 .166 .8684 .000094827
WDOTHRPS 14.9074282 13.98425 1.066 .2864 .003595234
WDOTHRPR 6.1407671 45.07322 .136 .8916 .001107748
Constant -.5028618 .46600 -1.079 .2805 N/A
               
Testing “big bath” firms:                         
 
Chi-squared =    4.22   Sig. level =  .03989       
 
Testing “income smoothing” firms:                         
 





The Traditional Random-Effects Panel Data Model Used to Test Hypothesis 3 

















Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistics p-value Mean of X 
UE 11.9615276 6.46932 1.849 .0645 -.015122955
WDBBPST 59.3588797 19.23918 3.085 .0020 .004038172
WDBBPRE 27.0516437 15.19097 1.781 .0749 .006592313
WDISPST 43.5194312 127.33367 .342 .7325 .000210458
WDISPRE 37.0185382 275.08322 .135 .8930 .000094827
WDOTHRPS 25.6029795 16.76628 1.527 .1267 .003595234
WDOTHRPR -19.8005828 54.04153 -.366 .7141 .001107748
Constant -.1000154 .55854 -.179 .8579 N/A
               
Testing “big bath” firms:                         
 
Chi-squared =    2.89   Sig. level =  .08894          
 
Testing “income smoothing” firms:                         
 
Chi-squared =       .00                              Sig. level =  .98285
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Source: Titard and Pariser (1996). This flowchart is a graphical depiction of the general provisions of SFAS No.121. 
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